Other Articles in this Series:
- To Break a State in Two: The Birth of Bangladesh and the Sundering of Pakistan
- India’s November Campaign Part 1: The First Battle of Hilli, 22nd-24th November, 1971
- India’s November Campaign Part 2: The Battle of Garibpur, 20th-21st November, 1971
- India Invades “Bangla Desh”: How the Pakistani and Indian Strategies Matched up in the War of 1971
Introduction:
After the break out of all-out war on December 3rd, 1971, the Indian Army launched a lightning-fast invasion of erstwhile East Pakistan. As outlined in my previous article on the war, the Pakistani strategy of turning towns into fortresses was easily overcome by the Indian Army’s strategy of manoeuvre warfare and not giving battle on Pakistan’s terms. By December 10th, the Indian Army’s 95th Mountain Brigade under 101CZA (101st Communication Zone Area, an ad-hoc Division-strength formation) was nearing Dhaka. Standing against them was the Pakistan Army’s 93rd Infantry Brigade.
Having suffered multiple defeats and being severely understrength, the 93rd began to withdraw towards the vital bridge of Poongli over the Yamuna River in the town of Tangail. To stay on schedule and reach Dhaka before the Pakistanis could reinforce it, the 95th Mountain Brigade needed to capture the Poongli bridge intact. If the Pakistani 93rd got across it, they would detonate it behind them and the advance on Dhaka would be in grave danger. But, overhead in rickety planes, the Indian Army’s 2nd Battalion of the Parachute Regiment (2 Para) had different plans as – on December 11th – they descended in force on the town of Tangail, like demons from the skies.
Indian Army, Order of Battle:
Despite the entirety of the 95th Mountain Brigade driving towards the town of Tangail, the battle would only be done by 2 Para and 1 Maratha Light Infantry. Transporting 2 Para would be a huge fleet of Indian Air Force transport aircraft.
95th Mountain Brigade:
- 13th Battalion, Brigade of the Guards
- 1st Battalion, Maratha Light Infanatry
- 13th Battalion, Rajputana Rifles
- 56th Mountain Regiment (76mm guns)
- 852nd Light Battery (120mm guns)
- 94 Forward Company
- 2nd Battalion, Parachute Regiment (detached from F-J Sector Force)
Indian Air Force:
- 6 x An-12s (a Soviet transport aircraft)
- 20 x C-119 Boxcars (an American transport aircraft)
- 22 x C-47 Skytrains (an American transport aircraft with exceptional pedigree in airborne operations)
Pakistan Army, Order of Battle:
The Pakistani 93rd Infantry Brigade was badly mauled and severely understrength. They had suffered a string of defeats at the hands of the 95th Mountain Brigade but they were still an effective fighting force.
93rd Infantry Brigade:
- 33rd Battalion, Punjab Regiment
- 31st Battalion, Baluch Regiment (destroyed on December 10th by Indian 167th and 95th Mountain Brigades)
- 70th Battalion, Rangers (understrength, folded into 33 Punjab)
- 71st Battalion, Rangers (understrength, folded into 33 Punjab)
- ~5,000 x Razakars in loosely organised groups (severely understrength, though exact numbers are unknown, the Indian Army records that they were at about half-strength on Dec. 11th)
- 83rd Independent Battery (destroyed on December 10th by Indian 167th and 95th Mountain Brigades)
Even with the destruction of 31 Baluch on December 9th, the 93rd still had anywhere between ~3,500-4,000 soldiers on December 11th. They outnumbered the Indian force by possibly 2 to 1.
Indian Objectives:
The objectives outlined for 2 Para regarding the capture of Tangail are very easy to understand.
- Capture Poongli bridge and Tangail by midnight on the 11th
- Secure the ferry crossing on the East bank of the river
- Repel attacks by the 93rd Infantry Brigade until 1 Maratha arrives
By contrast, 1 Maratha had an even simpler objective.
- Break through the lines of the 93rd by the morning of December 12th
- Link up with 2 Para by the evening of the 12th
Pakistani Objectives:
The Indian fears were that the 93rd would seek to defend Tangail and Poongli bridge, inflict as many casualties as they could on the 95th, withdraw and then destroy the bridge. In fact, the 93rd was in such bad shape, that they had no intention of giving battle to the Indian force. As Maj. (later Brigadier) Siddique Salik records in his Witness to Surrender, their objective was:
- Withdraw across the Yamuna
- Reach Dhaka by December 13th
When the 93rd ran into 2 Para at Poongli Bridge, though they did give battle – and we’ll come to that in a bit – they quickly decided to find an alternative crossing point over the Jamuna and a new route into Dhaka.
The Advance of the 95th and the Plight of the 93rd:
Before we continue onto the Tangail battle, it’s important to understand why the 93rd was in no shape to stand and fight against a numerically far smaller force that was – to all intents and purposes – cut off from resupply. When war broke out, 101CZA’s objectives were clear and precise: they were to secure the border town of Kamalpur and advance to the city of Bakshiganj, following which they would quickly take the fortress-town of Jamalpur before marching on Tangail and finally Dhaka. The road from Kamalpur to Bakshiganj was only lightly defended by units of the 93rd and as such, the Indian 95th captured it with relative ease and inflicted a significant number of casualties on 70 and 71 Rangers who had been assigned to defend this area. Alongside the Rangers, they came across a number of Razakars in these battles but the rag-tag militia did not stand much chance against the advance of the 95th.
The 95th would face its first staunch opposition on the 9th of December when it reached the fortress-town of Jamalpur. Jamalpur had been occupied and fortified by 31 Baluch which had been performing an effective fighting withdrawal from Kamalpur. In Jamalpur, 31 Baluch effectively held off the forward elements of the 95th for the first few hours. However, the 167th Mountain Brigade – which had been assigned to 101CZA on the 8th – arrived and assisted the 95th in surrounding Jamalpur. The 2 brigades, now outnumbering the Pakistani defenders in Jamalpur something like 4 to 1, besieged the town. The 2 brigades’ artillery guns, assisted by multiple air strikes conducted by the Indian Air Force, resulted in Jamalpur’s defenders being thoroughly shaken. Over the course of the battle, which ended on the 10th of December, 31 Baluch was absolutely destroyed. Of the ~700-800 men of 31 Baluch, about 300-350 were reported killed, 379 were captured and 100 – along with their CO, Lt. Col. Sultan, escaped to re-join the rest of the Pakistani 93rd. Alongside 31 Baluch, the 93rd lost all of its brigade artillery when every gun of the 83rd Independent Battery was either destroyed or captured in this battle.
With the destruction of 31 Baluch, the degradation of 70 and 71 Rangers and the halving of Razakar strength, the Pakistani 93rd Brigade had only one battalion of well-trained and well-equipped infantry left – 33 Punjab. They had also lost all of their artillery and, with the total destruction of the Pakistan Air Force in East Pakistan, they could not rely on air support either. As if that was not enough, the remnants of the 93rd were being constantly shelled and raided by a Mukti Bahini force commanded by Major Abdul Kader Siddique (not to be confused with Pakistani Brigadier Siddique Salik). Given these circumstances, Brigadier Abdul Qadir – the CO of the 93rd – made the only sensible decision available to him, withdraw to Dhaka.
And it was in this state that the 93rd stumbled across 2 Para, perhaps the best trained and equipped troops on the Indian Subcontinent at the time.
The Battle of Poongli Bridge:
The paradrop went like clockwork. The Indian Army, as mentioned in previous articles, had been planning this war since March/April 1971 and had known for months that it would have to perform an airborne operation at Tangail to capture Poongli bridge. Though preliminary planning for the operation had begun in the summer, detailed planning began in November when small recce teams of 2 Para – with the help of Major Abdul Siddique – crossed into Bangladesh. They got detailed photographs and descriptions of the land and – based off this intelligence – 2 Para’s paradrop was planned down to the last detail.
The drop-zone (DZ) selected was 9km north of Tangail on the east side of the Yamuna. Initially, the paras were to be dropped early in the night to allow the paras to take Poongli bridge at midnight when Pakistani sentries wouldn’t expect an attack. However, due to “the prevailing weather conditions” (as recorded by the IAF), the plan was changed and the paras would be dropped late in the afternoon, in the full view of Pakistani forces. So, on December 11th, 9km north of Tangail on the east side of the Yamuna between 1600hrs and 1630hrs, 750 men, 16 jeeps and 6 75mm howitzers would leap into battle.
In the drop, 20 paratroopers were scattered away from the DZ by either strong winds or safety concerns, but the majority of the paratroopers landed safely at the DZ. At this point, the drops were spotted by Brigadier Abdul Qadir from his Brigade HQ and immediately ordered that the landing force be interdicted and destroyed. He had guessed that they would be going for the bridge at Poongli and he quickly readied his remaining battalion to march to the bridge before the Indian force could take it.
However, inexplicably, word soon reached Brigadier Qadir that the paratroopers landing at Tangail were not Indians and were instead Chinese troops that had been sent to aid the Pakistani defenders. At this time, a lot of rumours – spread by Pakistan Army HQ in Rawalpindi to maintain morale – were circling in the Pakistan Army that the Chinese and the Americans had set up a joint task-force to relieve East Pakistan. Brigadier Siddique Salik, as he was on Gen. Niazi’s staff and privy to the fact that they were lies, records these rumours in great detail in his book, including a rumour that the Pakistan Army had taken Amritsar! But even then, it seems near impossible for Brigadier Qadir to have believed this information. And yet he did. He halted all preparations for his units to march on Tangail and waited to cross on the morning of the 12th.
As the 93rd Infantry Brigade let go of the opportunity to secure their retreat into Dhaka, 2 Para had regrouped and made the 9km trek to Poongli bridge. At this time, it was still day and any attack by the Paras would have been seen by the defenders of Poongli bridge. Unbeknownst to the Paras, Poongli bridge was only defended by 2 platoons (about 20-30 men) of policemen and its defenders were in no shape to repel the Paras. Regardless, they waited until night.
At 2000hrs, A, B and C Company of 2 Para attacked the bridge (with D Company in reserve) and it quickly fell. At this stage, they took no casualties and quickly set about preparing defensive positions. By now, word seems to have spread to Brigadier Qadir that the paratroopers were, in fact, Indian and they had taken the bridge. Immediately, 33 Punjab was ordered to attack the Indian paratroopers. A few companies of 70 and 71 Rangers as well as Razakars were also instructed to join in the attack.
Over the night of the 11th/12th, the 93rd conducted multiple attacks on the positions of 2 Para. These attacks were badly coordinated and poorly led and resulted in no success. In the night attacks, the Pakistanis lost 143 killed and 29 captured. Throughout the night, Indian ad Bangladeshi artillery continued to batter the positions of the 93rd, alongside multiple night-time airstrikes conducted by the Indian Air Force. On the morning of the 12th, the 93rd launched another attack on 2 Para’s positions, hoping for a final breakthrough. The shelling and air raids over the night must have taken its toll on the 93rd, because the attack on the 12th was mounted with just barely 500 men – most of them Razakars. In the morning attack, 139 men were killed and 13 captured. In both actions, 2 Para had lost a total of 3 men killed and 1 wounded.
As the 12th progressed, 1 Maratha linked up with 2 Para by the afternoon and the 2 battalions now mounted multiple raids on the remnants of the 93rd. The IAF conducted multiple airstrikes on the 93rd throughout the day and, by the time night fell, the Pakistani 93rd Infantry Brigade had ceased to exist as a fighting force.
Conclusions:
Indian Army units had surrounded Dhaka by the 14th of December and the Pakistan Army’s Eastern Command surrendered on the 16th of December, 1971. Perhaps the best conclusion to this article is the fact that when Dhaka fell, the first Indian unit to enter the conquered and liberated city was the 2nd Battalion of the Parachute Regiment. Their actions at Tangail are often considered to be the direct reason that Dhaka was unable to receive the reinforcements it desperately needed. With their capture of Poongli Bridge, 101CZA and the majority of IV Corps (CO, Lt. Gen. Sagat Singh) in general had unimpeded access to Dhaka. Though the Indian Army slowed its advance after the 12th to allow the Pakistani and Indian governments to negotiate a surrender, the road to Dhaka was now completely open.
As for the Pakistani 93rd Brigade, they were in tatters. With their defeat in Tangail, they crossed the river in rowboats or waded across. Almost all their vehicles had been destroyed by the IAF and there was no fast way for them to reach Dhaka. All of them were on foot and quickly got separated from each other. Brigadier Qadir was leading a group of 26 men through thick jungles to reach Pakistani positions at Kaliakar but was spotted and arrested by Indian troops. Lt. Col. Sultan, also making his way to Kaliakar with a few troops, was arrested. The survivors of the 93rd reached Dhaka on the 13th and 14th and there was not a single officer among them. According to Brig. Salik, “they were unshaven, unwashed and even bootless. Their faces were starved, eyes sleepy and ankles swollen. They needed at least twenty-four hours [rest] to participate in the defence of [Dhaka].”
Sources
Brig. Siddique Salik, Witness to Surrender (Oxford University Press; 1979)
History Division, MoD, Official History of the 1971 Indo-Pak War (Chapters 12 to 15)
Leave a Reply