Introduction:
The Nizari Ismailis were born in Cairo, the seat of power for Fatimid Egypt, in the year 1094. They were born out of the brutal division of faith and religion that marred Islam in this period. Though this article won’t go into great detail on the origins of the Syrian Assassins (my previous article does), it is important to understand that by the time the Assassins had settled themselves in what is modern-day Syria by the 1130s, they were vehemently opposed to the ruling classes of Fatimid Egypt. Having been driven out of the country in the late 1090s, they’d been looking for revenge for almost 4 decades.
In 1130, they would get their revenge – and it would be bloody and catastrophic. But, before that, you – the reader – must understand how the Assassins “conquered” Syria.
The Rise of the Assassins- 1100 to 1141:
When the Assassins first came to Syria, they had no friends and were – for the most part – trying only to survive. This fight for survival gave birth to the fear tactics they used, as will be explained later, and has inspired some modern misconceptions – with many believing them to be the first Islamic terrorists. However, before calling them terrorists it must be considered that they only used these fear tactics in the first few decades of their story in Syria, when their Aleppan ally Ridwan, the Emir of Aleppo (they had grown formidable here), died in 1113 and they were driven out of the city – with no place to go and nowhere to settle. This was when they were at their weakest and when their fear tactics were most used. However, by the 1120s, their fortunes had changed. The then Assassin leader, known as Bahram, entered into a treaty of sorts with Zahir Ad-Din Atabeg, the Emir of Damascus, and his vizier. The Assassins had, by now, more than made a name for themselves and their ferocity was known throughout Syria. It is not known whether Bahram used this reputation to enter into this treaty or whether Zahir Ad-Din Atabeg was simply partial to the Ismaili cause. Since no historian deals with this matter, it is not possible to fall back on secondary writing. However, if one were to infer from the evidence above presented, it seems reasonable to make the assumption that Bahram leveraged Zahir Ad-Din Atabeg through a threat to his life. Whatever the case, Bahram – in a series of events narrated by Ibn Al-Qalanisi – managed to secure a home for the Ismailis in Damascus and control over a fortress and town for the Assassins in Banyas, all without a drop of blood being spilled.
By 1141, the Assassins had become such an established power that they did not need to resort to backroom deals or fear tactics to take control of territory they wanted. The greatest example of this is their swift capture of their most famous castle; Masyaf. According to Ibn Al-Athir, the Assassins – by means of trickery – snuck into the castle, isolated its Emir and murdered him. Masyaf would not be the first or the last castle to be captured by the Assassins (between 1132 and 1160, the Assassins built, captured or bought 9 major castles) but it is an important marker. Up until their acquisition of Masyaf in 1141, the Assassins had been an almost incorporeal force, influencing the Holy Land from the shadows, with only one stronghold (the famous Qadmus Castle) to their name. However, with the capture of Masyaf, they would become something more concrete. The capture of Masyaf signalled the growing influence and power of not just the Assassins but the Nizari Ismaili sect of Islam. It also acted as a beacon of continued Ismaili existence despite the best efforts of the Suni Muslims to wipe them out. In Aleppo, following the death of Ridwan, his son ordered the Ismailis to be massacred. In Damascus, the people grew tired of the dominance of the Ismailis and their rampant murdering of officials even slightly opposed to their continued existence in the city. Therefore, Emir Toghtekin began to eradicate the Ismailis in the city in what can only be described as a pogrom. The Assassins would lose control of Banyas and their leader, Bahram, would be killed in 1128 in a misguided feud with a local Seljuk lord. And yet, by 1141, they would become more powerful than at any time within the past three decades.
The Scourge of Egypt:
For over 100 years, between the years 909 and 1101, the Fatimid Caliphate – one of the most powerful nations in the Medieval Middle East – was ruled by a succession of fathers and sons. From al-Amir bi-Akham Allah (the first Caliph in 909) to al-Amir ibn al-Mustansir (who took the throne in 1101), the line of rulers was unbroken with the son taking over the Caliphate from the father. For the majority of its duration, the Fatimid Caliphate was united under one religion – Shi’a Ismailism. But, in 1094 (as enumerated in my previous article), this unity was shattered with the passing of Caliph Abu Tammim al-Mustansir. As explained in the previous article, the Ismaili Imam (in this case, the Imam and Caliph were one and the same) was decided based on who was deemed to be the most direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad. When al-Mustansir died, there was a split over who would be Imam/Caliph: his elder son Nizar or his younger son Abu al-Qasim Muhammad ibn al-Mustali. Because of the influence of a powerful general, al-Mustali became the next Caliph. And on that day, the Nizari Ismailis swore vengeance on the Fatimid Caliphate.
In 1130 the Assassins targeted and eliminated the Caliph of the Fatimid Caliphate, al-Amir ibn al-Mustali alongside many of his men in Cairo, the heart of Fatimid power. According to Bernard Lewis and Farhad Daftary – two of the most pre-eminent scholars on the Assassins – this was a task that the Assassins held to be fundamental. Lewis in fact argues that the Assassins believed the Fatimids to be their single greatest enemy after the Turks, that the Fatimid Caliph who ruled from Cairo was nothing short of a usurper and that it was the sacred duty of the Nizaris to oust him and ‘establish the Imamate of the Line of Nizar’. While the Assassins didn’t quite manage to take control of Fatimid Egypt, the immediate consequence of these actions did upset the Caliphate and triggered a succession crisis, with no one knowing who would replace the murdered Caliph – his infant son with a regent or his cousin. However, the real consequence came in the form of four decades of utter instability and paralysing indecision among the ruling classes. The Caliphs that came after al-Amir were not accepted as legitimate Caliphs by any Fatimid citizen, for a multitude of reasons.
Firstly, al-Amir ibn al-Mustali (not to be confused with his father, Abu al-Qasim ibn al-Mustali) was to be succeeded by his son – al-Tayyib. However, shortly after al-Amir’s death, al-Tayyib (who was only 6 months old at the time) was cast aside. The boy had no regent appointed to him by his father before he died and as such, there was no one who would rule on his behalf. Instead, al-Amir ibn al-Mustali’s cousin, Abd al-Majid, took the throne for himself. This was totally unprecedented: Abd al-Majid was not a direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad and thus could not sit on the Fatimid throne.
Following Abd al-Majid’s coup, there followed a succession crisis with rulers coming and going or being murdered left and right. Essentially, the Fatimid people – all of whom were Ismailis – did not accept the rule of anyone that was not the direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad. The assassination of al-Amir ib al-Mustali in 1130 destroyed the Fatimid ruling class and tore open a hole in Fatimid society. The Assassins had, in one afternoon, beheaded one of the most powerful empires in the region and turned its courts into a gaggle of squabbling men doing their best to grab power.
In the end, the Fatimid Caliphate would never recover from the series of succession crises that befell it. The Caliphate would be crumbling by the middle of the 12th Century and would be in a sorry state by 1169.
In 1169, a man called Salah ad-Din Yusuf ibn Ayyub became the Fatimid Caliphates Grand Vizier (Prime Minister). Salah ad-Din Yusuf ibn Ayyub is better remembered today as Saladin, one of the finest military minds of the Medieval period and the greatest foe of the Christian Crusader States – a foe they did not manage to vanquish. In 1171, having realised that the Fatimid Caliph is weak and the Caliphate is dying, he deposed the Caliph and proclaimed himself Sultan of Egypt.
Sources:
Ibn Al-Athir, The Chronicle of Ibn Al-Athir for the Crusading Period from al-Kamil fi’l-Ta’rikh (Vol I, II), tr. D. S. Richards (Ashgate; 2005)
Ibn Al-Athir in Francesco Gabrieli (ed., tr.), The Arab Historians of the Crusades (Taylor & Francis: London, 2009), pp. 9-10
Ibn Al-Qalanisi, The Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades (Dover Publications; New York, 2002)
Barber, M., (tr./ed.), Bate K., (tr./ed.), Letters from the East: Crusaders, Pilgrims and Settlers in the 12th-13th Centuries (Routledge; Abingdon, 2013)
Daftary, Farhad, A Short History of the Ismailis: Traditions of a Muslim Community (Edinburgh University Press; Edinburgh, 1998)
Daftary, Farhad, (ed.), Jiwa, Shainool, (ed.), The Fatimid Caliphate: Diversity of Traditions (I. B. Tauris; London, 2018)
Daftary, Farhad, The Ismailis: Their History and Doctrines (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge, 2007)
Daftary, Farhad, ‘The “Order of Assassins”: J. Von Hammer and the Orientalist Misrepresentations of the Nizari Ismailis’, Iranian Studies, 39:1 (March; 2006), pp. 71-81
Lewis, Bernard, The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam (Basic Books; New York, 2003)
Lewis, Bernard, ‘Saladin and the Assassins’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 15:3 (1952), pp. 239-245
Lewis, Bernard, ‘Kamal al-Din’s Biography of Rasid al-Din Sinan’, Arabica, 13:3 (October; 1966), pp. 225-267
Nossov, Konstantin, ‘Assassin Castles: Strongholds of a Militant Sect in Syria’, Medieval Warfare, 5:4 (2015), pp. 39-43
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