This article has been written for Easy History by Patrick Moody, a historian of the English Civil War.
England in the 1600s and the English Civil War:
There is no root cause for the English Civil War. It could be classified as a religious or economic conflict. It could also be called a power struggle between the crown and Parliament; absolute monarchy vs. limited monarchy. Any of these classifications is perfectly valid, but historical analysis shows that the First Civil War was not brought about by a singular cause, rather that the cause was an amalgamation of beliefs, events, and personalities that led to the eventual clash between the King and his Parliament.
Charles I was a difficult monarch. Having never a fan of Parliaments, he rarely called them, and when he did, it was only to obtain money for his wars in Scotland (i.e. the First and Second Bishop’s Wars) Ireland, or the Continent, wars which many in both Houses of Parliament considered needless. When Charles dissolved Parliament in 1629, he ruled by his own authority, a time known as the “Personal Rule”, for eleven years. With no checks and balances to keep him in place, Charles could finally run the kingdom as he saw fit. He re-introduced the ‘ship-money’ tax; fees imposed on coastal counties for naval defense and upkeep. It was an old custom, one of many that Charles would resurrect during the conflict, including the Commission of Array (essentially allowing officers or gentry to raise their own army for the King). Yet this ship-money was different. Charles needed more cash to finance his wars, so he imposed it on all counties, coastal and inland.
One notable holdout was a Member of Parliament for Buckinghamshire and a leading critic of Royal authority: John Hampden. His trial for refusing to pay the ship-money tax has become famous, with even the American Founding Fathers evoking Hampden’s name shortly after the Boston Tea party, and his ‘signature’ could be found at the foot of many revolutionary pamphlets spread in the city at the time. From a certain standpoint, one could say this imposed tax was the beginning of the rift between the anointed king and his own subjects.
After eleven long years, Parliament was finally called back, and only then to finance yet another war in Scotland. This was essentially an uprising caused by Charles’ forcing of the Book of Common Prayer (the Bible adhered to by the English) onto the Scots, who were hardline Presbyterians and adhered to their own religious body, the Kirk. Parliament was not exactly thrilled with Charles and how the Stuart monarchy had been operating on both the military and religious front. His relationship with the Roman Catholic Church, the traditional ‘enemy’ of the English people, was also a point of high contention. His wife, Henrietta Maria, a French Catholic, was allowed to keep her own priests, much to the chagrin of Anglicans, Puritans, and Presbyterians alike. Ever distrustful of Charles’ true loyalties, Parliament drew up a document called the Grand Remonstrance, essentially a list of grievances they had with the Crown, refusing to lend any more money until their demands were met.
Seeing himself as a ruler chosen by God, Charles would have none of it. Instead, he marched soldiers into Parliament House and demanded the arrest of the “Five Members” whom he saw as the chief instigators: John Hampden, Denzil Holles, Arthur Haselrig, John Pym, and William Strode. Having been forewarned, they fled, and Charles, empty-handed and feeling powerless, left London, fearing for the safety of his wife and children. In only a few short months, he would raise his standard at Nottingham, officially declaring war on Parliament.
The “What-If” of the Battle of Turnham Green:
The Battle of Turnham Green is regarded as the third largest gathering of troops on English soil, with the battles of Towton ad Marston Moor being the larger ones. In the months after the first major battle of Edgehill, with both sides claiming victory, Charles marched his army of 12,000 east towards London, hoping to take the city. Unfortunately for the King, the Earl of Essex (an important commander of the Parliamentarian forces) had been shadowing the Royalists’ march and was already 5 miles outside of the city, his forces – numbering 24,000 – had been bolstered by fresh troops from the London Trained Bands and hundreds of civilian volunteers. By the time Charles’ army reached Chiswick Common Field, he was faced with the full might of the Parliamentarian war machine.
Parliament had an overwhelming advantage, yet as was the case often enough, many thought Essex did not take the opportunity to bring the war to a definitive conclusion. One of the main complaints lodged against Essex was the reversal of his orders to send arms and men to John Hampden, MP for Buckinghamshire and one of the notorious “Five Members” Charles tried to arrest, who was the only Parliamentarian commander on the Royalist left flank.
Had Colonel Hampden received Essex’s promised regiments of foot, horse, and two pieces of artillery, might Turnham Green have been the decisive battle of the Civil War? It is possible, given the amount of trust Parliament put into Hampden as a military leader, that he could have conducted maneuvers to hamper or even destroy the Royalist Army from the rear. In fact, such was the faith placed in Hampden’s skills that many in Parliament believed that he should have replaced Essex as the commander of Parliament’s forces.
The two pieces of artillery – had they reached Hampden – may have been positioned on the spur of ground on Acton Hill between Bollo Brook and Stamford Brook, close to the Royalists’ weakened left. To avoid friendly fire, Hampden’s gunners needed to aim the pieces to shoot just behind enemy lines, either as a scare tactic or to inflict actual damage to the Royalist rear, forcing them to move closer to Essex, pushing against their front ranks in their haste to avoid cannon fire.
The artillery, filled with case shot or only gunpowder, would fire essentially ‘blanks’ as a simple scare tactic. The noise and smoke being enough to make the fiery Prince Rupert (Charles’ nephew and commander of the Royalist Cavalry) divert his cavalry towards the sound of these surprise cannons, allowing Essex’s forces to bear down on confused Royalist infantry.
Hampden’s Green Coats, at this time numbering just shy of 1,000 men (according to the Battlefields Trust the regiment was 963 strong just one month prior), had already seen action the night before, covering the retreat of a Parliamentarian assault on Brentford, keeping the Royalists at bay. Some accounts even recorded that Hampden’s troops charged the Royalists’ five times to cover the retreat. This action was recognized by the Committee of Safety, which commended Hampden for his stalwart defense and prevention of Parliamentarian casualties.
While Charles’ army struggled to form on Turnham Green, Hampden had the unique position of not only being above and behind enemy lines, but also the only commander on the ground with his regiment, as Holles and Brooke were both in London.
Bolstered by Essex’s reinforcements, his own green coats and the remnants of Brooke’s Purple Coats, Hampden would have the luxury of dividing his troops, sending units to retake key houses and bridges lining Charles’ assumed escape path under the cover of his artillery ‘bombardment’.
A small garrison at Gunnersbury House would block any Royalist escape towards the village of Acton while Hampden moved around the main entrance to Brentford to avoid remaining Royalist troops. A hard march of more than 2 miles, but possible given proper motivation.
With control of Sir Richard Wynn’s House and the bridge over the Brent, Hampden would have a secure position to block any royalist retreat with his remaining men, possibly 2,000 if he was garrisoning houses or holding key points along the way. A small number to block a retreating army, to be certain, but it’s important to note Charles’ men would be quickly bottlenecked had Essex been pursuing from the rear, Hampden’s acting as the anvil to Essex’s hammer.
Given the distance, it would have taken some time and great risk, Northumberland’s Syon House could have been another viable option for Hampden to take. Only held by a single regiment of foot under Thomas Blagge, the great house sat in a suitable location above the Thames. This was proven when Blagge’s men fired effectively on Parliament’s gunpowder barges on their way to London.
With a Parliamentarian garrison at Syon House, Wynn’s House, Gunnersbury House, and possibly West Sheen and Little Ealing, Charles would have great difficulty extracting his nearly 12,000 men from their cramped position, effectively surrounded in a rough triangle.
Conclusions:
Had Turnham Green been a Parliamentary victory, potentially leading to a forced capitulation by Charles, Rupert’s banishment, and the remainder of the Royalist Army being forced to disarm and go home, would the limited monarchy that most of Parliament had taken up arms for been ushered in? Charles would have had little choice but to entertain both Houses’ grievances, lack of military support swaying a decision to abdicate in favor of one of his sons, or, in an extreme circumstance, a close contender for the throne; Northumberland being a potential choice, for example.
Sources:
The Brentford & Chiswick Local History Society
Lipscombe, Nick The English Civil War: An Atlas & Concise History of The Wars of the Three Kingdoms 1638-51. (2020).Osprey Publishing. London.
Marsh, S., & Porter, S. (2011). The Battle for London. Amberly. Gloucestershire.
The Battlefields Trust
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