Introducing the Primary Source:
Those who read my previous article concerning the rapid advance of the Indian Army’s 95th Brigade would already be familiar with the destruction of the Pakistani 31st Battalion of the Baluch Regiment in the siege of Jamalpur. On the 8th of December, the Indian 95th Infantry Brigade – on its advance towards Dhaka – reached the fortified town of Jamalpur, occupied by the Pakistani 31 Baluch. By the evening of the same day, the town had been completely surrounded and was being subjected to intense artillery fire by the Indian forces.
On the morning of the 9th, the Pakistani defenders were outnumbered perhaps 2 to 1 and being battered constantly. Things would get worse for them as, on the 10th, the entire Indian 167th Infantry Brigade arrived to assist the 95th on their advance towards Dhaka. With the arrival of an entire fresh brigade, the Pakistani battalion was outnumbered 4, perhaps 5, to 1.
It was under these circumstances that Brigadier H. S. Kler, the Commanding Officer of the 95th, sent a messenger to Lt. Col. Sultan, the Commanding Officer of 31 Baluch. The messenger carried with him a letter that requested the surrender of 31 Baluch. Lt. Col. Sultan, in his response, declined to surrender and opted to fight on.
In this article, I will transcribe both these letters, discuss how they reflect upon the East Pakistan Campaign as a whole and the fate that befell the – on the surface – brave and bold Lt. Col. Sultan.
Brigadier Kler’s Letter:
To,
The Commander
Jamalpur Garrison
I am directed to inform you that your garrison has been cut off from all sides and you have no escape route available to you. One brigade with full complements of artillery has already been built up and another will be arriving by the morning. In addition you have been given a foretaste of a small element of our Air Force with a lot more to come.
The situation as far as you are concerned is hopeless; your higher commanders have already ditched you.
As a soldier to a soldier, I give you an assurance of safety and honourable treatment when you surrender, since that is the only course now left to you. I am quite sure you will not be foolhardy in risking the lives of the men under your command for your personal ego. You may have heard the appeal of our Army Chief[1] and I once again reiterate that if you wish to be reunited with your families, the only course open is to surrender. We will arrive at the formalities as soon as I get your reply.
It may be pertinent to point that in case you fall in to the hands of the Mukti [Bahini] or their sympathisers, they are most unlikely to spare your lives; your colleague Capt. AHSAN MALIK wisely surrendered to me at KAMALPUR on 4 Dec and he and his men have been well looked after as per the GENEVA CONVENTIONS.
I expect your reply before 6:30PM today, failing which I will be constrained to deliver the final blow, for which purpose 40 sorties of MiGs[2] have been allotted to me.
In this morning’s action, the prisoners captured by us have given us your strength and dispositions and are in a position to let you down. They are well looked after.
The treatment I expect to be given to this civil messenger shall be according to a gentlemanly code of honour and no harm should come to him.
An immediate reply is solicited.
9 Dec 1971 Brigadier H S Kler
[1] – On the 9th of December, the Indian Army transmitted a message from General Sam Manekshaw on all radio channels used by the Pakistan Army in the East. The message was thus: “Indian forces have surrounded you. Your Air Force is destroyed. You have no hope of any help from them. Chittagong, Chalna and Mangla ports are blocked. Nobody can reach you from the sea. Your fate is sealed. The Mukti Bahini and the people [of Bangladesh] are all prepared to take revenge for the atrocities and cruelties you have committed…Why waste lives? Don’t you want to go home and be with your children? Do not lose time; there is no disgrace in laying down your arms to a soldier. We will give you the treatment befitting a soldier.”
[2] – Brigadier Kler is likely referring to the Sukhoi Su-7 “Fitter” here. Though the venerable MiG-21FLs were used by the IAF to attack ground targets in the war, the majority of air striks were carried out by the Su-7. The Su-7 was a staple of the War in East Pakistan. In the Western Theatre, the IAF’s ground attacker of choice was the indigenously designed and built HF-24 Marut, which even managed to shoot down a PAF F-86 Sabre and became renowned as a tank buster.
Lt. Col. Sultan’s Response:
Jawalpur
1735hrs, 09 December 71
Dear Brig.,
Hope this finds you in high spirits. Thanks for the letter.
We here in Jawalpur are waiting for the fighting to commence. It has not started yet so let us not talk and start it.
40 sorties, I may point out, are inadequate. Please ask [of] you many more.
Your remark about your messenger being given proper treatment was superfluous. Shows how you underestimate my boys. I hope he liked his tea. Give my love to the Muktis.
Hoping to find you with a Sten in your hand next time, instead of the pen you seem to have so much mastery over.
I am your most sincerely,
Commander Jawalpur Fortress
Enclosed with the envelope was a single bullet.
Conclusion and an Analysis of the Letters:
Brigadier Kler seems to be writing with, in his mind, the foregone conclusion that 31 Baluch would surrender without a fight. This idea was likely formed by him given the repeated surrenders of multiple companies of the 70 and 71 Rangers (see the mention of Captain Ahsan Malik) and Razakars. The 95th, up until they reached Jamalpur, did not encounter any Pakistani defenders very keen on fighting the superior Indian force. This was most probably compounded by the likely assumption on Brig. Kler’s part that Lt. Col. Sultan saw the hopeless position he was in.
But Lt. Col. Sultan had a different view in mind. 31 Baluch had been stationed in Jamalpur since November with the sole goal of fortifying it and preparing for an Indian siege. Lt. Gen. A. A. K. Niazi, the GoC-in-C of the East Pakistan Command had assured all his officers that their “Forts” would be capable of holding out against a 14-day siege at the very least. Before the 95th reached Jamalpur, the Indian Army had not had the opportunity to engage in any siege warfare and thus, the assurances offered by Lt. Gen. Niazi would still have been fresh in Lt. Col. Sultan’s mind. On top of this, as recounted by Maj. (later Brig.) Siddique Salik, the Pakistan Army HQ was spreading huge amounts of propaganda and lies among the Pakistani officers in the East to maintain morale – from “the Chinese are about to launch an intervention” to “the Pakistan Army has taken Amritsar”. It is also likely that Lt. Col. Sultan believed the Indian Army was on its last legs and Brig. Kler was making empty threats.
At any rate, Lt. Col. Sultan’s response sealed his unit’s fate.
When the given deadline passed, the 95th and 167th attacked.
At 0630hrs on the 10th, Indian radiomen picked up the following signal “Hello any Indian station! This is a Pakistani station! We want to surrender!” When the surrender request was acknowledged by the Indian forces and Brig. Kler drove into Jamalpur to formally accept the surrender, he found that the request was made by a Major who had been the senior most officer in-charge. The 95th took 379 men of 31 Baluch as POWs and counted another 300 dead. Lt. Col. Sultan was nowhere to be seen – neither among the dead or the prisoners.
It was later revealed that he, along with 100 men, had escaped the siege and was making his way for the Brigade HQ of the Pakistani 93rd Infantry Brigade. After the 93rd’s disastrous attempt at taking Poongli Bridge from India’s 2 Para, Lt. Col. Sultan was arrested by Indian forces along with the survivors of 31 Baluch.
Sources:
Brig. Siddique Salik, Witness to Surrender (Oxford University Press; 1979)
Letters in: History Division, MoD, Official History of the 1971 Indo-Pak War (Chapter 13)
V. K. Singh, Leadership in the Indian Army: Biographies of Twelve Soldiers (SAGE; 2005)
S. Raghavan, 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh (PB; 2020)
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