Introduction:
In December of 2024 alone, the Indian Navy has commissioned the 7th ship of the Talwar-class of frigates – INS Tushil – and will be commissioning INS Surat (the 4th and final ship of the Visakhapatnam-class of destroyers), INS Nilgiri (the 1st of 7 Nilgiri-class frigates) and INS Vagsheer (the 6th and final of the Batch I of the Kalvari-class submarines). For comparison, between December 2023 and December 2024, the Indian Navy only commissioned two large combatants – the Visakhapatnam-class destroyer INS Imphal and the Arihant-class nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) INS Arighat. Starting in 2025, the Indian Navy will commission at least 3 major ships every year until 2028 – though in 2025 itself, they may commission at least 4. Furthermore, starting in 2026, the Indian Navy will begin construction of the truly monstrous Project-18 and 2025 could see Cochin Shipyard break ground on a 2nd Vikrant-class carrier under the project name IAC-2.
This short account of what the Indian Navy plans to commission before 2028 does not include the over 1 dozen dedicated ASW Corvettes that will begin delivery next year or the litany of support ships under construction and in various stages of delivery. This massive order book begs the question; why? Historically, the Indian Navy has maintained a much smaller navy but has always managed to maintain dominance in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). So why the change in policy? That is the question this article will seek to answer.
Indian Navy Doctrine:
Perhaps the easiest way to answer this question would be to scream “China! China!” and end the conversation there. Certainly, China and its growing presence in the IOR is a part of it – and we will cover it later on in the article – but it’s more complicated than that. One must remember, that naval strategies – things such as which ships to build, where to build them, what should they be armed with, where to build ports, etc. – are built up over decades. In naval affairs, an action taken in 2024 – for instance – will not bear fruit until years later. And so to understand why the Indian Navy is expanding rapidly, one must look at how this expansion has been carefully planned since at least 2004.
Starting in 2004 – and again in 2009 and 2016 – the Indian Navy has written papers on the doctrine it will follow. Once the aim of that doctrine has been achieved – or if a change is needed – a new doctrine will be set in place. The doctrine set by the Indian Navy in 2015-16 is still in effect as it is filled with extremely long-term goals. The 2016 doctrine, titled Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy, sets the following objectives for the Indian Navy:
- Deter conflict and coercion against India
- Conduct maritime military operations in a manner that enables early termination of conflict on terms favourable to India
- Shape a favourable and positive maritime environment, for enhancing net security in India’s areas of maritime interest
- Protect Indian coastal and offshore assets against attacks and threats emanating from or at sea
- Develop requisite maritime force levels and maintain the capability for meeting India’s maritime security requirements
Perhaps now – especially given the last objective – the Indian Navy’s sizeable order-book of ships makes some sense. But to what end are they deploying such a fleet? For this, we must consult the other objectives on the list – specifically the 2nd, 3rd and 4th.
The Indian Navy aims to create a “favourable and positive maritime environment” for the nation. In creating this environment, not only would the Indian Navy ensure the security of Indian civilian and economic maritime assets but would also play a significant role in boosting the net security of the IOR. However, this environment cannot be created without conducting maritime military operations that enable the Indian Navy to protect the nation’s maritime assets from any potential threats. And in order to do this, it needs a large number of ships – ships that employ modern weaponry and are operated by well-trained crews. Now that order-book makes more sense!
In late 2023 and 2024, the Indian Navy got the rare opportunity to put theory into practice when the Israel-Palestine conflict spilled into the Red Sea – one of the world’s most vital trade routes.
The Indian Navy in the Red Sea:
The Red Sea – specifically the Bab el-Mandeb – is existentially vital to the world’s trade. It is the gateway from the Suez Canal to the Indian Ocean and vice versa. All the trade between Europe and all of Asia passes through here – from cheap clothes to irreplaceable microprocessors. After Israel launched its invasion of Gaza in response to the 7th October attacks, the Houthi rebels in the Arabian country of Yemen declared an open season on all cargo ships passing through the Bab el-Mandeb that were linked to Israel. This, of course, did not last and they soon began to strike any cargo ship they could find. The initial attacks were by heliborne boarding parties that would take control of the cargo ships, but the Houthis soon upgraded to firing Chinese missiles and Iranian drones.
This prompted a massive international response and ships of navies – mostly the US, French and Indian Navies – began to concentrate on the Bab el-Mandeb to provide escort to cargo ships and security against Houthi drone and missile attacks. These navy ships were initially deployed around what is known as the Horn of Africa to deter against the infamous Somali Pirates. These Pirates, noticed that the ships that did make it through the Bab el-Mandeb were now no longer protected and took up attacking them once more.
This was the situation with which the Indian Navy’s Western Fleet was faced. Missile attacks on one end and piracy on the other. In short, the “favourable and positive maritime environment” that had existed for years prior was now seriously and credibly threatened. Everything that the Navy had practiced since 2016, all the systems it had put in place and the new ships they had commissioned would now be put to the test.
And they passed with flying colours. The Indian Navy relegated itself to providing non-combat support in the Red Sea – such as MEDEVAC to injured crew, fire-fighting for struck vessels, etc. This could have been for one of many reasons, but the primary was likely the fact that the US Navy, the French Navy and the Royal Navy had nominated themselves to provide an air-defence umbrella in the region. The Indian Navy did not see the need to interfere with their operations – and this was likely communicated between the 4 forces to avoid any mishaps. Despite this, INS Tabar – a Talwar-class frigate known to have been deployed in the Red Sea – was recently spotted with kill marks that confirm the Indian Navy shot down multiple Houthi drones and missiles. They seem to have chosen to not publicise this.
Along the Horn of Africa – where the Indian Navy was nearly the sole armed military presence – the operations were much more directly military. In a March 2024 press release by the MoD the Indian Navy was confirmed to have undertaken nearly 1000 Visit Board Search & Secure (VBSS) operations in the Red Sea, which resulted in over 110 hostages (including 45 Indian) rescued from pirates. This was between December 2023 and March 2024. The most notable of these VBSS actions was the intervention of the hijacked MV Ruen by Indian Marine Commandos (MARCOS).
All in all, the Indian Navy was confirmed to have deployed 21 warships in the region (not including Coast Guard long distance patrols) with the specific goal of providing escort and security to the cargo vessels that were under threat. In total, these 21 warships provided direct armed escort to 450 Indian and foreign cargo vessels between December 2023 and March 2024. The actions undertaken by the Indian Navy in the Red Sea are demonstrators – they are a proof of concept.
The Indian Navy has proven that it can provide net security in the IOR, they have proven that they can deploy considerable force well beyond India’s mainland and use that force to achieve military objectives. In short, they have proven that they can carry out the mission as laid out by the 2016 doctrine.
And this is where the conversation becomes about China.
The Indian Navy and the People’s Liberation Army Navy:
The Chinese navy, better known as the PLAN, far outclasses the Indian Navy in almost every metric. It is bigger, it has larger and better armed ships, it has better carrier-borne aircraft and the capabilities of its submarine force are matched only by Russia and the US. The PLAN is the single most credible threat the Indian Navy has faced since the 1965 Indo-Pak War. But this picture is not all that bleak.
The PLAN is bigger and, in some senses, better equipped – yes. That is not, however, a cause for concern for the Indian Navy – at least, not as big a cause for concern as it seems to be. The PLAN’s primary objective is to stage an amphibious assault against Taiwan (some may prefer “Republic of China”) and to protect that amphibious assault against inevitable US intervention. For this, China needs a very, very large navy. In fact, most of China’s military might is gathered on its coastline because it predicts the war to annex Taiwan to be the most significant war it will ever fight.
Only a small contingent of the PLAN is arrayed against the Indian Navy. This is because the Chinese know that in order to dominate the IOR, they would need to send a sizeable force through a very tiny gap – the Malacca Strait. Any PLAN naval task force that attempts to force the Malacca Strait would be hideously exposed to attack from the Indian Navy – from submarine ambushes to massed missile strikes. They would be within range of the Andaman Nicobar Islands – a veritable Indian naval fortress, that is bursting with Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles (LR-AShMs).
The PLAN knows, therefore, that to push such a force through the Malacca Strait they would need to neutralise the Andamans – and the best way to do that would be to send H-6 strategic bombers South across Myanmar. At that point, the security of the Indian Navy in the IOR rests upon the shoulders of the Indian Air Force and their ability to intercept and shoot down any PLAAF attacks on the Andamans. To illustrate this any more would be to go too far into the realm of the hypothetical.
The point is, that while the Chinese are a credible threat and the Indian Navy is doubtlessly preparing for a potential naval conflict with China – that is not the Navy’s primary concern. Any potential naval conflict with China would be precedented by years of high tension and a long and protracted ground war on the shared border. This potential conflict would also mean the loss of dozens of warships on both sides. No, the Indian Navy’s primary concern is ensuring that the Republic of India can exert her will on the IOR and to provide a force capable of deterring hostile action against the exertion of that will.
In Conclusion:
The additions to the Indian Navy’s roster of active duty ships and the expansion of its capability has been dictated by doctrine. While the Indian Navy’s actions are certainly designed – in part – as a hedge against the PLAN’s encroachment into the IOR, they are not planning for a direct and full-scale conflict with the PLAN in the near future. The Indian Navy’s actions are informed, almost entirely, by its doctrine which necessitates the Navy to build a large force capable of deploying to any corner of the Indian Ocean Region at a moment’s notice.
Sources:
Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy: https://bharatshakti.in/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Indian_Maritime_Security_Strategy_Document_25Jan16.pdf
March 2024 MoD Press Release: https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2016201
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