This article has been written for Easy History by Eddie Monkman.
Introduction:
The history of European integration is one of economic, political, and, to an extent, security cooperation, shaped by the continent’s turbulent past and shifting global alliances. In the aftermath of the Second World War, European nations sought unity as a means of ensuring lasting peace, avoiding the mistakes of the interwar period, and rebuilding a devastated continent. Unlike economic cooperation, which progressed steadily, military unification was neither necessary nor politically feasible, largely due to the transatlantic security guarantee provided by the United States through NATO.
Yet, as geopolitical realities shift and U.S foreign policy priorities change, Europe is now confronted with a difficult question: can it continue to rely on American military protection, or must it forge a new path toward greater strategic autonomy?
The History of European Integration:
Since the concept of European integration was first pursued at the London Six-Power Conference in 1948, the project – in its various forms – has been responsible for economically, socially and politically integrating Europe. By 1945, much of Europe lay in ruins after enduring two global conflicts in less than half a century. Rather than repeating the mistakes of the Treaty of Versailles, which emphasised reparations and division, Western Europe pursued unity as a means of preventing future conflict.
The Nazis had been defeated, however, out of the ashes of the Second World War came a new threat to European security in the form of the Soviet Union, a western ally during the war. In February 1948, the Soviet-backed Communist Party of Czechoslovakia successfully assumed control of the country in a coup d’état that would see them lead the country for over four decades. The coup led to the London Six-Power Conference being held and the Soviet Union boycotting the Allied Control Council – the Cold War had begun in Europe.
For the next five decades, the project of European integration expanded. In 1957, the signing of the Treaty of Rome saw Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany create the European Economic Community. Until the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, Europe had a political and military opposition on its eastern border. Despite this, the project of European integration never led to the creation of a centralised European army. While the idea for a European army was occasionally floated by Europhiles, the desire was never there from the member states who crucially make up the executive branch of the EU.
The Era of the US Security Guaruntee:
However, it was not merely a lack of appetite on the side of the Europeans that meant that a European army was never created. Quite simply, it was never necessary as Europe had a reliable security guarantor on the other side of the Atlantic. During the Cold War era, Europe and the United States shared a common enemy. The Soviet Union dictated the foreign policy of both continents and so, given Europe’s proximity to the Soviet Union, it made sense for the U.S to back the project of European integration and alleviate the need for Europe to form its own military.
Europe was able to focus on its economic and political integration without having to confront the challenge of military unification. Member states could maintain relatively small militaries, knowing that the U.S. was Europe’s security guarantor. This symbiotic relationship is what underpinned the liberal global order of the twentieth century.
Supranational organisations such as NATO meant that if any one nation were to be attacked, then all other members – including the US – would be obliged to respond. This relationship has benefitted both sides.
For Europe, they have been guaranteed security from aggressive foreign powers by the world’s largest military for 70 years. For the U.S, they have had a raft of allies who are willing to support them politically and militarily in foreign policy campaigns across the world. They have also not faced the threat of a large-scale force developing in western Europe as it did in the first half of the twentieth century. The liberal world order has been so foundational in the political assumptions of the west since the end of the Second World War that the thought that it might one day cease to exist has barely crossed the collective consciousness.
The New Era of European Security:
But a new reality has dawned, and Europe is being faced to reckon with it. Since Donald Trump defeated Kamala Harris in November 2024, Europe knew that a significant change was coming, however the speed at which Trump has actioned such change seems to have taken Europe by surprise and forced the hand of European leaders. Last week, the U.S President announced that he and Russian President Vladimir Putin had held talks over a peace deal in Ukraine over the phone and this week the two sides begun peace talks in Saudi Arabia – absent from the meeting were Ukrainian officials.
When pressed on whether Ukraine would be an ‘equal partner’ in any peace talks, Trump refused to commit and Ukraine – nor Europe – should make any assumptions that the Ukrainians will be invited in. Former U.S President Joe Biden was an ardent supporter of Ukraine. When Russia first launched their invasion back in February 2022, they did so on the assumption that they would be facing a fractured west. Contrary to their assumption, the invasion in fact unified western powers and saw the U.S invest heavily in NATO and supporting Ukraine.
For Russia, the war shifted from being a ‘smash and grab’ to one of attrition. The initial response from the west was unified and definitive – support for Ukraine was non- negotiable. However, nearly three years on to the day of the invasion, Russia has worn the west down; its waiting game has worked. The unification that came as a result of the invasion has worn away and the western alliance is fractured. A Trump led U.S is at best a reluctant – and at worst a former – member of NATO and European nations face internal political conflicts which are resulting in wavering support for Ukraine. The post- war transatlantic security framework, which relied on assumed U.S military backing, is facing an existential crisis.
With Trump prioritising national interest over global stability, Europe can no longer assume its security is guaranteed by Washington. Trump sees the world as areas of influence rather than as a connected collection of interlocking conflicts and interests. For Trump, a conflict between two Slavic nations in Eastern Europe is not in the U.S’ sphere of influence and so why should it be something that the U.S is to get involved in? If Russia can provide him with a solution, or a ‘peace’ more efficiently than the Europeans can, then Trump is likely to take it.
The Divergence of US and European Policy:
But a resolution for the U.S is not a resolution for Europe. The U.S and Europe have conflicting ideas about European security, a dramatic shift in the state of affairs and now Europe must decide how to address this fact. Last week, at the Munich Security Conference, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called for Europe to, ‘build the armed forces of Europe so that Europe’s future depends only on Europeans and decisions about Europe are made in Europe’. After nearly 70 years of relying on the U.S as the continent’s security guarantor, this is a hard concept for Europe to contemplate.
Zelensky’s call for a European army is a sign of a European leader publicly acknowledging the change in the state of global affairs. Following Zelensky’s calls for the formation of a European army, French President Emmanuel Macron convened a meeting of ‘informal talks’ between the leaders of Germany, the UK, Italy, Poland, Spain, the Netherlands and Denmark as well as EU and NATO officials. Macron has previously hinted at his own desire for Europe to develop its own army however since Zelensky’s comments last week, no such utterances have been forthcoming.
Despite Zelensky’s calls and Macron’s informal talks, the idea of a European army remains highly divisive among member states. France, a historic advocate of European strategic autonomy, has pushed for greater military cooperation, while Germany, despite its economic and political strength, has been reluctant to take a leading military role. Meanwhile the UK, post-Brexit, occupies an ambiguous position – keen to maintain a strong defence posture but wary of aligning with an EU-centric initiative over its transatlantic ties and Eurosceptic opposition parties.
A European army would also have broader implications for NATO’s non-European members. Canada, traditionally aligned with U.S foreign policy, may be hesitant to support European defence independence if it leads to NATO’s decline, especially as they attempt to reconfigure their diplomatic relationship with their closest historical ally. The shifting power dynamics between Europe, the U.S, and NATO’s non-European members add another layer of uncertainty to the continent’s evolving defence strategy.
While in Europe, Euroscepticism remains a persistent and growing force across Western European democracies, fuelled by concerns over national sovereignty, democratic accountability, and economic priorities. Any plan to integrate sovereign armies into a unified European defence force—or to invest heavily in an entirely new military structure—would likely face significant resistance, particularly from nationalist and right-wing populist movements that have gained substantial traction in recent years.
The formation of a European army would not only be a political challenge but also an economic one at a time when European economies are struggling. Most EU states have historically underinvested in defence, due to their reliance on the U.S. security umbrella. Some nations, already burdened with economic difficulties, may resist the reallocation of their funds. The question of funding – whether through collective EU defence budgets or national contributions – could be a major sticking point.
Conclusion:
As Europe faces a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape, the long-standing assumptions about transatlantic security are being tested more than they have for nearly 70 years. For decades, European integration has thrived under the protection of the U.S-led security order, allowing the continent to focus on economic and political cohesion rather than military unification. However, the shifting priorities of the U.S, exacerbated by Donald Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy, have forced European leaders to reconsider their security dependencies. The growing divide between Washington and Brussels underscores the urgent question of whether Europe can – and should – forge its own path in defence.
Europe’s reliance on American military support has long been both a strength and a strategic vulnerability, but breaking away from it would not be easy, nor would it be universally welcomed on the continent. The idea of a European army may continue to be a subject of debate rather than a reality in the near term. However, what is certain is that Europe can no longer take its security for granted. Whether through greater NATO coordination or an independent European force, the continent must now take decisive steps toward securing its own future in an increasingly multipolar and unpredictable world.
Further Reading:
- S. C. Hix, B. Hoylund, The Political System of the European Union (Palgrave MacMillan; 2011)
- J. McCormick, Understanding the European Union – A Concise Introduction (Red Globe; 2021)
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