Introduction:
I had, on the 8th of this month, the unique pleasure and privilege of interviewing Brigadier Baljit Singh Gill, VrC, of the Jat Regiment about his experiences in the 1971 India-Pakistan War and the journey of his battalion as the conflict progressed. His battalion advanced through East Pakistan on a lesser-known arm of the offensive, aiming to take Chittagong instead of Dhaka. On the 13th of December 1971, Brigadier Gill – then a 2nd Lieutenant – was wounded in a firefight and had to be evacuated. Besides this, Brigadier Gill provides us (both, the casual reader and the earnest historian) invaluable insight into how the war was conducted on the ground in East Pakistan.
In presenting the content of the interview, however, I will not be adopting the traditional method of articulating verbal interviews in writing. Instead of a faithful transcription of the questions I asked and the answers he provided, I will be crafting the story he told of his and his battalion’s adventures in the 1971 India-Pakistan War. I have added, in parts, additional context to the story – these bits of detail I have sourced from my usual library of sources which can be found either in the Reading List or in the footnotes of all my other 1971 articles.
In this article, I will present the story of Brigadier Gill and of 31 Jat, detailing the actions they fought and the victory they won. In the next article, I will cover Brigadier Gill’s first-hand accounts of the Pakistani atrocities, the treatment of POWs, the mood of Bengali civilians, the state of Indian logistics and the role played by the Mukti Bahini in East Pakistan.
An Introduction to Brigadier Baljit Singh Gill:
Brigadier Gill was commissioned into the Indian Army’s 31st Battalion of the Jat Regiment (modern 12 Jat) in December of 1970. For his actions in the very early phase of the Indian intervention in East Pakistan, he was awarded the Vir Chakra (VrC). He would continue to serve with distinction and would command his battalion in the Indian intervention in the Sri Lankan Civil War. He would retire in 2006 after a distinguished career.
31 JAT before the Outbreak of War:
31 Jat, which was raised in February of 1970, was raised as a counter-insurgency – or COIN – force and was deployed to fight the Mizo Insurgency in the state of Mizoram as a part of the Indian Army’s operation to quell the insurgency – Operation Battle Axe. When, in March of 1971, news spread to the battalion that Pakistan had begun its massacre of Bengalis with the launch of Operation Searchlight, the battalion was under the command of 57 Mountain Division. Despite the news of the atrocities Pakistan was committing, the mood in the Indian Army was that there would not even be a war with Pakistan, much less an invasion of East Pakistan. This understanding can be explained away by the fact that such Pakistani atrocities were not uncommon, with clampdowns on democracy and political leadership in East Pakistan having been routine practice over the past 20 years.
However, that understanding would quickly change by April/May when orders were received from Delhi that the IA had to begin to train up the “Mukti Bahini” – Bengali freedom fighters. To do so, the IA created a number of training camps throughout the Indian North East and in West Bengal. Initially in May, 31 Jat had the responsibility of overseeing training of a few camps in Mizoram, however by June, they were given direct control over a single camp in Demagiri (modern Tlabung) in southern Mizoram. As the battalion began to wind down its COIN operations in preparation for all-out war, the commander of IV Corps – General Sagat Singh – was giving orders for “Special Missions” to be carried out throughout East Pakistan as early as September of 1971.
In the words of Brigadier Singh, General Sagat Singh was a “bold officer” who seized every opportunity he could to take the initiative – a characteristic typified not only by his use of helicopter assault tactics (Op. Cactus Lilly) but by his decision to carry out secret “Special Missions” in East Pakistan, well before war had broken out. These missions had two purposes. A) to perform reconnaissance of Pakistani positions and ascertain their strengths and dispositions and B) to establish “moral ascendency” over the Pakistan Army.[1] In September, 31 Jat carried out one such mission – leading the strike was 2/Lt. Gill.
The September Surgical Strike:
2/Lt. Gill was placed in charge of a platoon of men from “C” Company of 31 Jat. Their target was a Pakistani riverboat convoy that was set to sail on the 10th of September from the Pakistani cantonment in the town of Rangamati on the western bank of Kaptai Lake. In order to affect the total destruction of the convoy, the platoon would put in 10 days of hard preparation. Preparations would include practicing laying ambushes on a river bank as well as target practice on moving & river-borne targets. After all the preparation had been completed, the platoon – maintaining strict radio silence the entire time – crossed into East Pakistan on the night of the 7th of September – guided by two Mukti Bahini soldiers (one of whom was named Ashok and was a graduate of Chittagong University).
Indian Order of Battle:
- 1 x platoon, “C” Company, 31 Jat
- Supported by:
- 1 x 2-inch mortar
- 1 x 3.5-inch shoulder fired rocket
- Multiple Heavy Machine Guns (HMGs)
- 1 x Sniper team
Pakistani Order of Battle:
- 2 x HMG armed motorboats, one vanguard and one rear-guard
- 1 x Sandbag and armour-plate reinforced and HMG armed tugboat
- 1 x “Country boat”, i.e. local rowing boat
2/Lt. Gill’s platoon would reach their chosen ambush point – an S-bend on the Karnaphuli River just south of Rangamati – at 0800hrs on the 9th of September, after stealthily trekking through the East Pakistani jungles for more than 30 kilometres. Here they would lie in wait for almost 24 hours until, at 0400hrs on the 10th of September, they would hear the rumble of the engines of their targets. At 0530hrs, the engines died down as the Pakistani convoy approached the S-bend and slowed down to navigate it.
At 0600hrs, 2/Lt. Gill’s platoon would open fire. The firefight would last for less than 3 minutes. Initially, all that 2/Lt. Gill could tell was they had been successful in destroying their target and had lost no men. Immediately after concluding the ambush, they “double-timed” it back to base, making much faster pace than before as they were not worried about stealth, and reached by nightfall.
Soon after, Major P. S. Bajwa – the Company Commander of “C” Company – received intelligence from the Mukti Bahini that 2/Lt. Gill’s ambush had resulted in the total destruction of the Pakistani convoy, having killed 1 officer and 10 men with 18 others injured. For his role in leading the mission, 2/Lt. Gill was awarded the Vir Chakra in January of 1972.
The War:
Though IV Corps had been conducting probing attacks all throughout East Pakistan, they were not the main focus of attention. By September – and even more so by October – the Indian Army was preparing for an invasion of East Pakistan. For 31 Jat, this meant redeployment, reorganisation and being given a new role. Given that 31 Jat was raised as a COIN battalion, it did not have any of the heavier equipment necessary to sustain itself in a peer-to-peer conflict. As such, by October, the battalion was outfitted with heavy weapons’ platoons wielding weapons such as medium mortars and rocket launchers. Apart from that, the battalion was moved from 57 Mountain Division and placed under the authority of the HQ of “Kilo Force”, an ad-hoc brigade sized formation that was under the direct command of IV Corps. Also making up Kilo Force were 32 Mahar and elements of the 4th and 10th battalions of the East Bengal Regiment, which were Pakistani Bengali deserters.
Furthermore, to confuse enemy intelligence, 31 Jat was divided into 2 Battle Groups (31 Jat and 35 Jat) and each was referred to as a battalion, giving the impression to the Pakistan Army that Kilo Force had 3 regular Indian battalions and 2 battalions of the East Bengal Regiment. In order to create this division, 31 Jat’s 4 infantry companies (A, B, C & D) were split into 6 – with the addition of E and F Companies. Given that this would stretch 31 Jat too thin, 2 companies from the 4th and 10th EBR were assigned to the battalion to bolster their strength.
It was in this form that 31 Jat would cross into East Pakistan with the outbreak of war on the 3rd of December.
While the majority of IV Corps focused on crossing the Meghna River and positioning Indian tanks and artillery on the North Eastern corner of Dhaka; Kilo Force and the 83rd Infantry Brigade were given the order of cutting across the Chittagong Hill Tracks and taking the city of Chittagong. This Indian thrust, known as Operation Trump Card, would be defended against by the Pakistani 53rd Infantry Brigade. 31 Jat was selected to be the vanguard of the advance – it was the battalion at the front of every attack. Supported by “extremely effective” artillery fire and accurate air support, the Pakistani 53rd was quickly pushed back, forcing them to withdraw north to avoid total destruction. By the 10th, only 15 and 42 Baluch remained to defend against the Indian thrust.
By the 13th of December, however, the Pakistani defence had collapsed. 31 Jat had, the day prior, taken a position known as T.B. Sanatorium Hill from 42 Baluch, overlooking the city of Chittagong. 42 Baluch, trying to affect some sort of counter attack, stormed the Indian positions. Though the attack was soundly beaten, 2/Lt. Gill was shot thrice in the left thigh. He was immediately evacuated from the front line.
2/Lt. Gill’s Evacuation:
- Carried out of the firing line by one of his men and was carried on piggy back from the combat to the Regimental Aid Post (RAP)
- At the RAP he was administered first aid and preliminary surgery was undertaken without the use of anaesthesia (as the RAP only had 2 doses left)
- Then, he was taken by road to the Advanced Dressing Station (ADS) which was managed by the brigade (or, in this case, Kilo Force) at Teliamora
- Following that, he was taken by road to a railway junction where an all-AC Ambulance Train took him to the Guwahati Base Hospital
- Following a short stay there, he was taken by air to Delhi where he would spend 3 months recovering
The End of the War:
31 Jat would end their war in Chittagong. When the Pakistan Eastern Command(s) surrendered on the 16th of December, so too did all Pakistani forces in Chittagong. On the 17th, 31 Jat took charge of 1,360 Pakistani POWs. Most of them were from the Naval Base at Chittagong, but some were from 42 Baluch.
The battalion would remain in Chittagong until the 23rd of December. On this date, they were redeployed to Mizoram and took charge once again of their old COIN duties. For their actions, the men of 31 Jat were awarded 2 Vir Chakras, 2 Sena Medals and 1 Mention-in-Dispatch. Over the course of the war, 31 Jat suffered a total of 16 dead – 1 Officer, 2 JCOs and 13 ORs.
As I mentioned above, Brigadier Gill also spoke at length about his personal accounts of Pakistani atrocities, civilian reactions, logistics etc. Had I had the space, that part of our interview would follow immediately, but if I do so, the article will become too unwieldy. The second part of the interview, however, is coming soon!
[1] Moral ascendancy here is a play on “morale”, with the aim of such missions being to degrade the enemy’s morale with constant small attacks.
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