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  • The Horrors of World War 1, Vol. II: “Blasted bombs dropped on helpless civilians”, The Zeppelin Raids on England

    The Horrors of World War 1, Vol. II: “Blasted bombs dropped on helpless civilians”, The Zeppelin Raids on England

    Introducing the “Zepp” Raids:

    On the 7th of September, 1940, a total of 965 fighters and bombers of the German Luftwaffe appeared on British radar screens with the sole objective of turning the South East of England – London in particular – into dust. Over the next 57 days, multiple times a day, anywhere between 300 and 400 German fighters and bombers would raid England 350 times. On the 7th of September alone the German bombers killed 430 civilians. Between September 1940 and May 1941, the Blitz – as it would come to be known – killed 44,000 civilians. But this was not the first, or indeed the only, Blitz.

    25 years prior, in January of 1915, 2 M-Class Zeppelins of the Imperial German Navy sailed through the air and bombed England, killing 4 civilians. This would be the first time in modern history that a war being fought far away – in this context, Africa and Europe – would be brought to the doorstep of civilian life.

    The L2 was the second Zeppelin that entered German service. The metal tube-like structures that can be seen hanging from the ship are its gondolas and house the crew, bombs and everything they need to survive. L2 would crash and kill all aboard her before entering service.

    Over the next 3 years, Zeppelins would raid England 51 times, killing 557 people and injuring about 1,500. These numbers when compared to the apocalypse brought to London by the Blitz, seem insignificant. But, for the people of England – indeed for the people of the world – who had never expected to have been confronted so directly by the horrors of war, it was a shock to the nervous system.

    But, to once again quote Indy Neidell, this was modern war.

    Launching a Zeppelin Raid: A German Officer’s Account

    1st Lt. Dr. Hans Gebauer was an Observation Officer aboard a German Navy Q-Class Zeppelin in 1917 when, in March of that year, he – along with 4 other Zeppelins – had been given the order to bomb London. He gives a detailed account of what it took to launch a Zeppelin raid and what the action over England was like.

    A drawing of a German Zeppelin shed.

    Firstly, he mentions that the raids could only be launched once or twice a month during what they called the “Raid Period”. Given that launching a daylight raid would be suicide, they had to launch at night time. Even then, a Zeppelin was hundreds of meters long and anyone with eyes could have seen it when the moon was out and search-lights were turning the night sky into a minefield of light. Therefore, they had to wait for the days of cloudy weather and no moon. These 2 or 3 nights a month constituted their “raid period”. Every few weeks leading up to the raid period, Zeppelin crews would be carrying out practice flights and performing modifications to their ships, waiting for the order to hit England.

    On March 16th, Lt. Gebauer received exactly such an order.

    L3 in its shed.

    The order had come through in the morning of the 16th but it was not till the late afternoon that the 5 airships were ready to launch. This is because, contrary to the procedures required for planes, launching a Zeppelin was a very complex process that required hundreds of people to put in a significant amount of effort over multiple hours.

    The first step was to mount the bombs. This process alone took about 2 hours, with each bomb having to be individually rolled from the armoury to the Zeppelin and hoisted individually up into the belly of the beast using a crude pulley system. Simultaneously, ground crew were scrambling all over the aircraft tying a number of straps to it by which it would be pulled out of the hangar (then called the shed) and into the open for launch. Again simultaneously, engineers would be performing final tests on the engines, rotors and machinery while even more ground crew stuffed the gondolas with rations, gloves and warm clothing, and hot drinks in thermos flasks.

    While this was all happening, the crew themselves would often take an early dinner given the fact that they may not be returning to enjoy another hot meal. And when their dinner was done, they marched to the hangar and waited for the ship to be hauled out. The embarkation and launch process was also fairly complex but it was by far the least time-consuming step of the whole thing. When, finally, everything was done the Zeppelins would lift into the air and head out over the North Sea with their sights set on London.

    The shortcomings mentioned by Lt. Gebauer in his description were known to the British at the outset of the Zeppelin raids. In an article written in the New York Times by an officer of the Royal Navy in April 1915, the following is said about the Zeppelin attacks: “the Zeppelins can only trust themselves to make a raid … in very favourable circumstances. Strong winds, heavy rain or even a damp atmosphere [high humidity] are all hindrances to be considered. … It should be possible, more or less, to ascertain the nights in every month … in which raids are likely to be made”.

    Fighting the Zeppelin Menace:

    Given that the British were well aware that they could predict future raids based on the weather and the moon, they ordered more fighter patrols from the Royal Flying Corps (predecessor to the Royal Air Force) on the nights that suited the conditions for a Zeppelin raid. On the 3rd of September, 1916, Lieutenant William Leefe Robinson, of No. 39 Squadron was flying just such a patrol in a B.E.2c night-fighter over the South East of England. On that night, 16 German Zeppelins were heading straight for London, in the largest Zeppelin raid mounted in the whole war.

    Lt. Robinson was the first to spot one of the 16 airships, when he saw above him the grey, hulking mass of airship SL 11. Immediately, he went in for an attack and – after 2 attempts – the airship burst into flames and came crashing down, killing her 15-man crew. SL 11 became the first airship to be brought down over Britain and it sparked a new hope among Londoners that the routine bombing they had endured for well over a year would soon come to an end. For this impressive feat, Lt. Robinson was awarded the Victoria Cross, England’s highest military decoration and was presented with over 380,000 pounds in today’s money.

    A variant of the B.E.2c. The B.E.2c was a single-seater fighter as opposed to this variant which is a twin-seater.

    SL 11 would be the first but not the last. B.E.2c night fighters, between September and October of 1916, would shoot down 5 more airships. With the loss of entire raiding parties, the German Army would lose interest in bombing Britain and decided to preserve their airships for naval patrol and reconnaissance instead. The German Navy, of which Lt. Gebauer was a part, continued to bomb Britain but from higher altitudes using better airships, though with greatly reduced accuracy. From September 1916 to 1917, the Royal Flying Corps and British Air-Defence would shoot down a total of 30 airships, 37% of the total airships launched by Germany against Britain.

    A propaganda poster depicting the destruction of SL 11. Zeppelins were often called baby-killers by the Brits.

    Though by 1917 the airship threat was removed entirely, they had still caused great damage to the people of England.

    The British People and the Zeppelins:

    The purpose of the Zeppelin raids, or the “Zepp” as Britons came to call them, was to shock the British people into surrender. To make them believe that they were fighting an unwinnable war and that the only way out was to negotiate a peace in which Germany emerged the victor. J.H Stapely, a newspaper editor in London, had this to say about the German tactic:

    “Although the Zepps do get on a bit, they don’t put the fear of God into our hearts. They put the grim idea of a deadly revenge there instead, and that’s not exactly the sort of feeling to have towards mankind.”

    Stapely wrote this in October of 1915, back when Britain had no answer to the terror of the Zeppelin. Even then, the common Briton was not shaken into defeat by what seemed at that point in time an insurmountable problem. As Stapely puts it:

    “It was simply awful, to see that vile thing over our heads and we helpless to do anything. To see the blasted bombs being dropped on innocent civilians and peaceable houses made the blood go to fever heat and I felt absolutely MAD. … they did some damage to poor little children and some harmless civilians … and the GermHun devils call it WAR. They don’t know what war means.”

    An English commenter writing in 1917 about the raids in 1915 says that Germans had the exact opposite effect they wanted. In the face of bombing raids, more boys signed up for the army and more girls signed up for factory jobs. The Germans, who had expected the exact reverse, were only steeling their opponents’ resolve.

    All this anger, hatred and fear was released in a nation-wide shout of relief when Lt. Robinson shot down SL 11 on September 3rd, 1916. A young boy who had been sent to live with family in the countryside, away from London and the bombing, sees the flaming wreck of SL 11 crash into the ground and the morning after writes excitedly to his father.

    “There, right above us, was the Zepp! It was in flames, roaring and crackling. It went slightly to the right and crashed down into a field!!! … I would rather not describe the condition of the crew. Of course, they were dead – burnt to death. They were roasted, there is absolutely no other word for it. They were brown, like the outside of a roast beef. One had his legs off at the knees!”

    Map of a Zeppelin raid over England.

    Conclusions:

    French illustration of a Gotha bomber in action.

    The Zeppelin raids were, in the end, ineffective and remain an interesting rabbit hole for researchers or nerds to dive down. The whole concept of the airship, intended to be better than the aeroplane, would soon prove to be – like the Zeppelin bombers – unnecessary. As planes got larger, faster and more powerful, they could do what the Zeppelins could and much, much more. The Hindenburg disaster would prove the final nail in the coffin for a truly wondrous mode of transport and warfare. As the Zeppelins proved to be more and more ineffective, the Germany Army and Navy began to consider the “Gotha” – one of the world’s first purpose built, long range heavy bombers – for future raids on England.

    Sources:

    Patrick Blundstone, Letter to his Father, IWM Documents.5508

    J. H. Stapely, Letter to Mack, IWM Documents.11406

    J. G. Fairlie, “London’s Reaction to Aerial Bombardment”, The Military Engineer, 23:129 (May, 1931), pp. 201-204

    “The Death Plunge of a Zeppelin”, Current Conflict, 5:1 (October, 1916), pp. 125-126

    “Zeppelin Raids on London”, New York Times Current History of the European War, 2:1 (April, 1915), pp. 46-48

    C. Stienon, “The Zeppelin Raids and their Effect on England”, Current Conflict, 6:2 (May, 1917), pp. 333-337

    1st Lt. Dr. Hans Gebauer, Arnold Harvey (ed.), “Against Longon: A Zeppelin Officer’s Account”, Air Power History, 57:2 (2010), pp. 14-21

  • A Tale of Two Navies, Vol. II: The Indian Navy in the Arabian Sea; The Astonishing Success of Operation Trident

    A Tale of Two Navies, Vol. II: The Indian Navy in the Arabian Sea; The Astonishing Success of Operation Trident

    For a comprehensive breakdown of the objectives, ships, and situation that defined the requirements and plans for Operations Trident and Python, please read the previous article in this series which can be found here.

    Other Articles on 1971:

    Introduction:

    On December 2nd, 1971, Admiral S. M. Nanda orders the ships of the Western Fleet – in harbour at Bombay or in Goa – to put to sea immediately. All preparations are made and the fleet puts to sea in the night. It turns out to be in the nick of time. The Pakistani submarine, PNS Hangor, observes the massive Western Fleet from beneath the waves as it sails right over Hangor’s position. There erupts a row on-board the submarine, regarding whether they should ambush the Indian fleet or not. The sub Commander, deciding that he would not be the one to start the war (as, on December 2nd, the two nations were still at peace) orders the submarine to withdraw and instead informs Pakistani Naval Headquarters (P-NHQ) at Karachi of the Indian fleet movement.

    Had the fleet moved out even a few hours later, India and Pakistan would have been at war and the Pakistani submarine would have no reason not to attack and destroy the Indian Navy’s offensive capability in the Arabian Sea. But, as it happens, the men aboard the ships of India’s Western Fleet were not exactly certain why they were sailing out in such force. Many suspected that India and Pakistan would soon be at war. Apart from the commanding officers of the ships, the man had no idea what their plans were or what they were supposed to do. A little after midnight, they receive orders from Admiral Nanda that put away all doubts.

    “There is most reliable evidence that Pakistan will commence an all-out offensive against us … tomorrow … and the Western Fleet will be actively participating. Your Commanding Officers will inform you of my immediate offensive plan … at the right time. … Before I deploy you to battle, probably very soon, I would like you to know that I have the fullest confidence in each one of you and complete faith in our final victory at sea. Our cause is just and I can assure you that God is with us.”

    “Be bloody, bold and resolute.”

    The offensive plans that Admiral Nanda refers to are Operations Trident, Python and Triumph, set for December 3/4, December 6/7 and December 9/10 respectively. In these 3 Operations, Osa-Class missile boats from the 25th Missile Boat Squadron, escorted by either Petya-Class or Whitby-Class frigates, would conduct 3 separate surprise attacks on the Pakistani port city of Karachi with the specific goal of burning it to the ground. In the end, Operations Trident and Python would prove so successful that Operation Triumph was called off.

    In this article, we will explore the Indian Navy’s attacks on Karachi.

    Planning for Operation Trident:

    Operation Trident – rather the whole idea of a missile attack on Karachi using small boats – was predicated on P-NHQ’s underestimation of the Osa-Class boats. P-NHQ had taken into consideration the Osa-Class boats’ limited range, limited sea-worthiness when far from shore and their constant engine problems and had reached the conclusion that the Indian Navy would use these missile boats only for shore defence or short-range raids. Indeed, the boat’s designers – the USSR – had intended to use them just for that purpose. They were not meant to do what Operation Trident required done.

    Osa-Class missiles boats of the Indian Navy

    But the Indian Admiralty, led by Admiral Nanda, knew that they had no other class of ship armed with the long range missiles needed for Operation Trident. And so they tasked naval engineers and tacticians with overcoming the many problems that needed to be resolved if Operations Trident, Python and Triumph were to be a success.

    Given that the Navy had started planning these operations in the summer of 1971, well before the outbreak of war, the naval engineers and tacticians had something very valuable on their side – time. In that time, they came up with these following solutions:

    • To overcome the short range, the Osa-Class boats would be towed by their escort ships to the “launch point” using steel cables
      • On the way there and back, the strike group would be refuelled by the tankers INS Poshak
    • To overcome the seaworthiness issues:
      • Naval engineers performed a near total overhaul of the weak Soviet-made engines and boilers
      • Trained the crews on how to maintain these new engines and hulls to allow them to continue to operate in the deep seas

    The crews of the 25th Missile Boat Squadron were drilled constantly on these new tasks and procedures until they became second nature. A specific importance was placed on the procedure to hook up to and unhook from their escorts while at sea. The Commanding Officers planned, plotted and revised their routes, waypoints and missile release points.

    And finally, the plan was ready.

    • The Karachi Strike Group would form up West off Chhamb and 250 nautical miles south off Karachi in the afternoon/evening of the 4th of December
      • In the case of Operation Python, they would form up south-west off Karachi
    • After nightfall, maintaining total radio-silence, the Strike Group would move north and within 40-20 nautical miles off Karachi to release their missiles
    • Their main targets were: the Kemari Oil Tanks, any and all Pakistani warships, any and all Pakistani merchant ships and all harbour facilities in the port
    • They would then withdraw immediately to avoid being detected by aircraft patrols

    Operation Trident – 4/5 December, 1971

    Before we proceed, an ORBAT for Karachi Strike Group is given below.

    Escorts:

    • INS Kiltan, Petya-Class
    • INS Katchall, Petya-Class

    Osa-Class Missile Boats:

    • INS Nipat, 4 x Styx missiles
    • INS Nirghat, 4 x Styx missiles
    • INS Veer, 4 x Styx missiles
    INS Androth, a Petya-Class frigate of the Indian Navy

    And, at 2241hrs on the 4th of December, 1971, it was these 5 ships that were less than 50 nautical miles off Karachi when they spotted their first radar contact. The large radar contact had begun steaming south at speed and it became immediately obvious to the Strike Group’s commanding officer, Commander B. B. Yadav, that his fleet had been spotted. He guessed that this large radar contact was likely a Pakistani destroyer. If it managed to close to within range of its guns, Commander Yadav’s force stood little chance against such a larger opponent.

    A little after 2300hrs, the radar contact had not reduced speed and was definitely closing range. The Indian task force had no way of knowing it, but heading straight for them was the Pakistani destroyer PNS Khaibar. Commander Yadav quickly weighed his options and, at 2313hrs, he ordered INS Nirghat to open fire on Khaibar. The Nirghat fired two missiles, the first at 19 nautical miles away from the target and the second at 17 nautical miles. Both were direct hits. The stricken Pakistani destroyer opened fire with her main guns, relying on her radar to guide her shots – all shots missed. However, less than 6 minutes after the second missile had hit her, she slipped beneath the waves, taking 222 men with her.

    HMS Cadiz was a Battle-Class destroyed of the Royal Navay that was sold to the Pakistan Navy, becoming the PNS Khaibar.

    As Nirghat was engaging Khaibar, the Indian task force spotted another 2 radar contacts further north of their positions. Unknown to them this was the Pakistani destroyer PNS Shah Jahan and merchant vessel MV Venus Challenger. Commander Yadav ordered Nipat to open fire on these new radar contacts and immediately the ship let off 2 of her 4 Styx missiles at 2317hrs and 2326hrs.

    PNS Shah Jahan would be grievously damaged but not sunk. However, the Pakistani Navy – after the end of the war – decided to scrap her as the damage was deemed to be irreparable. The second ship, MV Venus Challenger, was carrying fuel and ammunition to the Pakistan Army in Bangladesh. As a result, when the missile hit her, she exploded into an inferno that broke into two and sank immediately, taking her whole crew with her.

    At this time, the Indian radars spotted another contact near PNS Khaibar’s position. Though this was smaller than a destroyer, it was fast enough to still be a patrol boat. Therefore, Commander Yadav ordered INS Veer to open fire on the contact. Veer fired off a single missile at 0009hhrs and the radar contact exploded. It had been the Pakistani minesweeper PNS Muhafiz. The minesweeper was of WW2 vintage and was made entirely of wood. When the missile hit, the ship’s hull disintegrated and everyone aboard her was lost. She was attempting to rescue the survivors of PNS Khaibar.

    Conclusions:

    In the midst of this naval action, the missile boats had also launched all their remaining missiles at Karachi. Though they had done great damage to the ships outside Karachi, their missiles fired directly at the port would have a lesser effect. The fire they caused at the Kemari Oil Tanks was put out quickly and had no lasting effect.

    However, the shocking surprise of the Indian attack made the P-NHQ nervous. They had lost their forward picket line in the defence of Karachi and were receiving very little in the way of support from the Pakistan Air Force which had earlier promised to patrol the seas. They could no longer guarantee the safety of their own ships, much less the merchant shipping under their charge.

    And they made the very controversial decision to withdraw all the forward deployed ships of their Western Fleet and dock them in Karachi. While they were docked within the port, the Indian missiles would have a much harder time of getting to them. And, though this decision was very unpopular with Pakistani Navy officers and sailors, it proved to be the right one when, in the night of December 8/9, another Indian surprise attack – Operation Python – destroyed Karachi’s oil tanks and port facilities, but could not sink any more warships.

    Everything was so meticulously planned and laid out that there was little chance for any ship or man deviating from the plan. And, as night fell on the 4th of December, as Karachi Strike Group inched closer to their target, that’s exactly what happened. Everything went off without a hitch. Those of you familiar with military history would know that times when plans proceed without so much as a hiccup can be counted on one hand. Whether it was luck or planning or perhaps a mixture of both that led to the startling success of the attack… well that’s up to you.

    Sources:

    Brig. Siddique Salik, Witness to Surrender (Oxford University Press; 1979)

    History Division, MoD, Official History of the 1971 Indo-Pak War (Chapters 11 and 15)

    Commodore Ranjit Rai, A Nation and its Navy at War (Frontier India; 2015)

    Hasan Zaheer, The Separation of East Paksitan (OUP Pakistan; 1996)

    Maj. Gen. Fazal Khan, “The Pakistan Navy at War”, in Commodore Ranjit Rai (ed.), A Nation and its Navy at War (Frontier India; 2015)

    Maj. Gen. Ian Cardozo, “Maritime Operations”, in In Quest of Freedom: The War of 1971 (CLAWS; 2016)

    S. B. Kesnur, M. Doraibabu, A. Kale “Operational Aspects of the 1971 War in the Maritime Domain”, in S. Chinoy (ed.), B. Bakshi (ed.), V. Chadha (ed.), 1971 India-Pakistan War: 50 Years Later (Pentagon Press; 2022)

    James Goldrick, The Development of the Navies of India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh; 1945-1996 (Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs; 1997)