For a comprehensive breakdown of the objectives, ships, and situation that defined the requirements and plans for Operations Trident and Python, please read the previous article in this series which can be found here.
Other Articles on 1971:
- To Break a State in Two: The Birth of Bangladesh and the Sundering of Pakistan
- India’s November Campaign Part 1: The First Battle of Hilli, 22nd-24th November, 1971
- India’s November Campaign Part 2: The Battle of Garibpur, 20th-21st November, 1971
- India Invades “Bangla Desh”: How the Pakistani and Indian Strategies Matched up in the War of 1971
- The Destruction of the Pakistani 93rd Infantry Brigade, the Tangail Paradrop and the India-Pakistan War of 1971
Introduction:
On December 2nd, 1971, Admiral S. M. Nanda orders the ships of the Western Fleet – in harbour at Bombay or in Goa – to put to sea immediately. All preparations are made and the fleet puts to sea in the night. It turns out to be in the nick of time. The Pakistani submarine, PNS Hangor, observes the massive Western Fleet from beneath the waves as it sails right over Hangor’s position. There erupts a row on-board the submarine, regarding whether they should ambush the Indian fleet or not. The sub Commander, deciding that he would not be the one to start the war (as, on December 2nd, the two nations were still at peace) orders the submarine to withdraw and instead informs Pakistani Naval Headquarters (P-NHQ) at Karachi of the Indian fleet movement.
Had the fleet moved out even a few hours later, India and Pakistan would have been at war and the Pakistani submarine would have no reason not to attack and destroy the Indian Navy’s offensive capability in the Arabian Sea. But, as it happens, the men aboard the ships of India’s Western Fleet were not exactly certain why they were sailing out in such force. Many suspected that India and Pakistan would soon be at war. Apart from the commanding officers of the ships, the man had no idea what their plans were or what they were supposed to do. A little after midnight, they receive orders from Admiral Nanda that put away all doubts.
“There is most reliable evidence that Pakistan will commence an all-out offensive against us … tomorrow … and the Western Fleet will be actively participating. Your Commanding Officers will inform you of my immediate offensive plan … at the right time. … Before I deploy you to battle, probably very soon, I would like you to know that I have the fullest confidence in each one of you and complete faith in our final victory at sea. Our cause is just and I can assure you that God is with us.”
“Be bloody, bold and resolute.”
The offensive plans that Admiral Nanda refers to are Operations Trident, Python and Triumph, set for December 3/4, December 6/7 and December 9/10 respectively. In these 3 Operations, Osa-Class missile boats from the 25th Missile Boat Squadron, escorted by either Petya-Class or Whitby-Class frigates, would conduct 3 separate surprise attacks on the Pakistani port city of Karachi with the specific goal of burning it to the ground. In the end, Operations Trident and Python would prove so successful that Operation Triumph was called off.
In this article, we will explore the Indian Navy’s attacks on Karachi.
Planning for Operation Trident:
Operation Trident – rather the whole idea of a missile attack on Karachi using small boats – was predicated on P-NHQ’s underestimation of the Osa-Class boats. P-NHQ had taken into consideration the Osa-Class boats’ limited range, limited sea-worthiness when far from shore and their constant engine problems and had reached the conclusion that the Indian Navy would use these missile boats only for shore defence or short-range raids. Indeed, the boat’s designers – the USSR – had intended to use them just for that purpose. They were not meant to do what Operation Trident required done.
But the Indian Admiralty, led by Admiral Nanda, knew that they had no other class of ship armed with the long range missiles needed for Operation Trident. And so they tasked naval engineers and tacticians with overcoming the many problems that needed to be resolved if Operations Trident, Python and Triumph were to be a success.
Given that the Navy had started planning these operations in the summer of 1971, well before the outbreak of war, the naval engineers and tacticians had something very valuable on their side – time. In that time, they came up with these following solutions:
- To overcome the short range, the Osa-Class boats would be towed by their escort ships to the “launch point” using steel cables
- On the way there and back, the strike group would be refuelled by the tankers INS Poshak
- To overcome the seaworthiness issues:
- Naval engineers performed a near total overhaul of the weak Soviet-made engines and boilers
- Trained the crews on how to maintain these new engines and hulls to allow them to continue to operate in the deep seas
The crews of the 25th Missile Boat Squadron were drilled constantly on these new tasks and procedures until they became second nature. A specific importance was placed on the procedure to hook up to and unhook from their escorts while at sea. The Commanding Officers planned, plotted and revised their routes, waypoints and missile release points.
And finally, the plan was ready.
- The Karachi Strike Group would form up West off Chhamb and 250 nautical miles south off Karachi in the afternoon/evening of the 4th of December
- In the case of Operation Python, they would form up south-west off Karachi
- After nightfall, maintaining total radio-silence, the Strike Group would move north and within 40-20 nautical miles off Karachi to release their missiles
- Their main targets were: the Kemari Oil Tanks, any and all Pakistani warships, any and all Pakistani merchant ships and all harbour facilities in the port
- They would then withdraw immediately to avoid being detected by aircraft patrols
Operation Trident – 4/5 December, 1971
Before we proceed, an ORBAT for Karachi Strike Group is given below.
Escorts:
- INS Kiltan, Petya-Class
- INS Katchall, Petya-Class
Osa-Class Missile Boats:
- INS Nipat, 4 x Styx missiles
- INS Nirghat, 4 x Styx missiles
- INS Veer, 4 x Styx missiles
And, at 2241hrs on the 4th of December, 1971, it was these 5 ships that were less than 50 nautical miles off Karachi when they spotted their first radar contact. The large radar contact had begun steaming south at speed and it became immediately obvious to the Strike Group’s commanding officer, Commander B. B. Yadav, that his fleet had been spotted. He guessed that this large radar contact was likely a Pakistani destroyer. If it managed to close to within range of its guns, Commander Yadav’s force stood little chance against such a larger opponent.
A little after 2300hrs, the radar contact had not reduced speed and was definitely closing range. The Indian task force had no way of knowing it, but heading straight for them was the Pakistani destroyer PNS Khaibar. Commander Yadav quickly weighed his options and, at 2313hrs, he ordered INS Nirghat to open fire on Khaibar. The Nirghat fired two missiles, the first at 19 nautical miles away from the target and the second at 17 nautical miles. Both were direct hits. The stricken Pakistani destroyer opened fire with her main guns, relying on her radar to guide her shots – all shots missed. However, less than 6 minutes after the second missile had hit her, she slipped beneath the waves, taking 222 men with her.
As Nirghat was engaging Khaibar, the Indian task force spotted another 2 radar contacts further north of their positions. Unknown to them this was the Pakistani destroyer PNS Shah Jahan and merchant vessel MV Venus Challenger. Commander Yadav ordered Nipat to open fire on these new radar contacts and immediately the ship let off 2 of her 4 Styx missiles at 2317hrs and 2326hrs.
PNS Shah Jahan would be grievously damaged but not sunk. However, the Pakistani Navy – after the end of the war – decided to scrap her as the damage was deemed to be irreparable. The second ship, MV Venus Challenger, was carrying fuel and ammunition to the Pakistan Army in Bangladesh. As a result, when the missile hit her, she exploded into an inferno that broke into two and sank immediately, taking her whole crew with her.
At this time, the Indian radars spotted another contact near PNS Khaibar’s position. Though this was smaller than a destroyer, it was fast enough to still be a patrol boat. Therefore, Commander Yadav ordered INS Veer to open fire on the contact. Veer fired off a single missile at 0009hhrs and the radar contact exploded. It had been the Pakistani minesweeper PNS Muhafiz. The minesweeper was of WW2 vintage and was made entirely of wood. When the missile hit, the ship’s hull disintegrated and everyone aboard her was lost. She was attempting to rescue the survivors of PNS Khaibar.
Conclusions:
In the midst of this naval action, the missile boats had also launched all their remaining missiles at Karachi. Though they had done great damage to the ships outside Karachi, their missiles fired directly at the port would have a lesser effect. The fire they caused at the Kemari Oil Tanks was put out quickly and had no lasting effect.
However, the shocking surprise of the Indian attack made the P-NHQ nervous. They had lost their forward picket line in the defence of Karachi and were receiving very little in the way of support from the Pakistan Air Force which had earlier promised to patrol the seas. They could no longer guarantee the safety of their own ships, much less the merchant shipping under their charge.
And they made the very controversial decision to withdraw all the forward deployed ships of their Western Fleet and dock them in Karachi. While they were docked within the port, the Indian missiles would have a much harder time of getting to them. And, though this decision was very unpopular with Pakistani Navy officers and sailors, it proved to be the right one when, in the night of December 8/9, another Indian surprise attack – Operation Python – destroyed Karachi’s oil tanks and port facilities, but could not sink any more warships.
Everything was so meticulously planned and laid out that there was little chance for any ship or man deviating from the plan. And, as night fell on the 4th of December, as Karachi Strike Group inched closer to their target, that’s exactly what happened. Everything went off without a hitch. Those of you familiar with military history would know that times when plans proceed without so much as a hiccup can be counted on one hand. Whether it was luck or planning or perhaps a mixture of both that led to the startling success of the attack… well that’s up to you.
Sources:
Brig. Siddique Salik, Witness to Surrender (Oxford University Press; 1979)
History Division, MoD, Official History of the 1971 Indo-Pak War (Chapters 11 and 15)
Commodore Ranjit Rai, A Nation and its Navy at War (Frontier India; 2015)
Hasan Zaheer, The Separation of East Paksitan (OUP Pakistan; 1996)
Maj. Gen. Fazal Khan, “The Pakistan Navy at War”, in Commodore Ranjit Rai (ed.), A Nation and its Navy at War (Frontier India; 2015)
Maj. Gen. Ian Cardozo, “Maritime Operations”, in In Quest of Freedom: The War of 1971 (CLAWS; 2016)
S. B. Kesnur, M. Doraibabu, A. Kale “Operational Aspects of the 1971 War in the Maritime Domain”, in S. Chinoy (ed.), B. Bakshi (ed.), V. Chadha (ed.), 1971 India-Pakistan War: 50 Years Later (Pentagon Press; 2022)
James Goldrick, The Development of the Navies of India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh; 1945-1996 (Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs; 1997)
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