There is a lot of detail this time in the footnotes so be sure to read them!
Introduction:
In 2021 and in 1989, two economic and military superpowers – in the first instance, America, and in the second, the USSR – were routed by poorly armed and barely organised Afghani insurgents. The images of the last Soviet vehicles withdrawing from Kabul or the final American C-17 transport aircraft taking off from the same city are burned into the memories of those who saw them beamed across TV or those who witnessed them with their own eyes. Such images are the central pillar of our modern understanding of Afghanistan – a land menacingly titled the Graveyard of Empires. But, in our modern memories of this storied land, we tend to forget that neither the Americans nor the Soviets were the first (ostensibly) imperial powers who attempted to subdue this country.
Afghanistan has proven to be extremely resilient to imperial rule throughout history – brushing off the Persian and Mughal attempts at direct control and opting instead to pay tribute.[1] And yes, one can say with some certainty that these Persian and Mughal attempts to pacify the Afghan nation were the first Imperial projects aimed at the land. But the difference between these efforts and the efforts made later in history is that the Persians and the Mughals, both dynasties born in Afghanistan, did not attempt to use military force. The first foreign power to attempt an invasion of Afghanistan, then, was the British Empire in 1838. The Armies of the British Empire and of British India would invade Afghanistan in 1838 for a plethora of reasons. The chief among them was that the British were convinced that Russia was going to launch an invasion of Afghanistan with the goal of threating British India. It is the story of Britain’s worst defeat before the 20th Century that this article and the next will tell.
From Sepoy to Subedar:
The question is, though, how to tell the story? For a historical narrative to be faithfully reconstructed, for a piece of history to be brought to life, the narrator is of utmost importance. In 1863, a book was published by the newly established British Indian Army through their press in Bengal. The book, was dedicated to “The JAWAN, past and present, with admiration and affection”. This book is the story of Indian officer, Subedar Sita Ram, who served in the British Indian Army (though, it was then the East India Company’s Bengal Presidency Army) from 1812 to 1849. In From Sepoy to Subedar: Being the Life and Adventures of a Native Officer of the Bengal Army, Subedar Sita Ram narrates his experiences while serving in the Bengal Presidency Army.[2] This book is an invaluable resource. For one, it is the only widely available published account of the East India Company’s Armies written by an Indian. The other reason is that it is one of the few sources available to us that recount in great detail expeditions such as the British invasion of Afghanistan as well as lesser known wars in British India, such as the Gurkha War or the two Sikh Wars.
The Invasion of Afghanistan:
Before From Sepoy to Subebar can be consulted, it is important to first understand the history of the First Anglo-Afghan War. The British invasion of Afghanistan in 1838 was perhaps one of the most poorly thought out military operations the British have ever carried out – an incredibly rare occurrence in the otherwise illustrious annals of British military history. If I were to sit here and recount the number of blunders the British made when simply planning the operation, the article would become an endless slag of meaningless words. But here are some of the highlights:
- The British had no maps of Afghanistan and instead relied on 30 year old travel diaries of a half-dead Sikh traveller
- The British General Officers for the invading forces were chosen based on how good friends they were with Lord Auckland, the Governor General of India
- Senior British officers neglected to bring essential supplies with them and brought instead cricket gear, instruments (including at least one grand piano) and their wine collections
- The British General Officers regularly ignored their spies – who had spent years in Afghanistan – regarding the political situation in Afghanistan
- Alexander Burnes, a senior British officer in Kabul and ambassador to the Emirate of Kabul, attempted – between 1841 and 1842 – to have an affair with one of the wives of Akbar Khan – a senior Afghani
Despite these faux pas, the British had reached Kabul by 1839. They had faced almost no resistance and had taken multiple cities, forts, towns and villages without so much as firing a shot. However, when the British began to set up their puppet government in Afghanistan, the fragile house of cards began to collapse. In 1842, the British Garrison at Kabul, of which Sita Ram was a part, was forced to retreat. In the infamous Retreat from Kabul (1842), the British attempted to withdraw to their bastion at Jalalabad, all the while being chased by lethally accurate Afghan snipers and the unending Afghan winter.
At the start of the retreat, the British Garrison at Kabul consisted of 4,500 soldiers and 14,000 civilians (Indians and Brits who were either the family of soldiers or were employed by the Army to provide a service such as cooking or cleaning). When the remnants of the British Garrison arrived at Jalalabad, the 4,500 soldiers had been reduced to one company (about 100 soldiers) of Gurkhas and maybe a dozen British officers.[3] It is believed that every single civilian who was present in the British Garrison at Kabul was killed. Sita Ram would be taken prisoner and sold into slavery – before being freed in 1846 by a British raid on Afghanistan.
Sita Ram’s account of the invasion, of their surprisingly pleasant stay in Kabul, of the retreat and of his enslavement, is a harrowing recollection of a brutal war in a brutal land. It describes in great detail the torturous march in the dead of winter across the frozen hell-scape of the Afghan mountains while men were slowly dropping dead of frostbite, disease and enemy action. In truth, Sita Ram’s account deserves more space and attention than is left in this article. That is why, next week, we will explore in depth the experience of this soldier in Britain’s worst defeat before the Fall of Singapore in 1942.
[1] The land now known as “Afghanistan” remained functionally independent, despite paying tribute to both the Persians and the Mughals at various points between the 15th and 18th Centuries.
[2] For about 30 years after the book was published, Sita Ram’s accounts were called into question by various historians. However, in the early 20th Century, Indian and British military historians verified – almost page by page – Sita Ram’s account and ratified its historical accuracy. It remains one of the most accurate personal accounts of the period; though its accuracy is somewhat hampered by the fact that Sita Ram wrote the book from memory, rather than consult a diary. For a more in-depth conversation about the provenance of the book; consult the Editorial Note which can be found here: https://archive.org/details/dli.pahar.0743/mode/2up
[3] There are multiple accounts of survivors. The popular myth is that only one British officer, Assistant Surgeon William Bryden, survived the Retreat from Kabul. In truth, an entire company of Gurkha troops survived almost entirely intact (these were the only Gurkha troops in the campaign) and British raids into Afghanistan between 1842 and 1846 would free over 2,000 Indian soldiers as well British and Indian officers. Modern history suggests that at least a few dozen British officers survived the Retreat from Kabul and made it back to the British bastion at Jalalabad.
