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Introduction:

To get a sense of the political and military events that led to the November offensive, please read “To Break a State in Two“.

In November of 1971, India and Pakistan were preparing for war in East Pakistan. From the start, the Indian Army had most advantages – it had superior numbers, the IAF had air superiority, the Indian Navy’s blockade of East Pakistan was unopposed and the Mukti Bahini was wreaking havoc behind Pakistani lines. But Pakistan had one crucial advantage – the time to prepare an effective defence.

In the face of these defences, Lt. Gen. Jagjit Singh Aurora, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Indian Army’s Eastern Command and General Sam Manekshaw, the Indian Army’s Chief of Staff, realised that there was a crying need to ready the way for the Indian Army’s upcoming offensives by softening and capturing these defences. And so, two attacks were ordered – one on the village of Bogra, just South-East of the village of Hilli, and the second on the village of Garibpur.

Indian Army, Order of Battle, Battle of Garibpur:

Garibpur, a small village, straddled the highway from India to Jessore – a vital city in East Pakistan. To ensure the smooth sailing of the Indian Army’s armoured columns to Jessore, this village needed to be taken. The Order of Battle was thus:

• 14^th Battalion, Punjab Regiment
• “C” Squadron, 45 Cavalry – PT-76 Light Tanks

Pakistan Army, Order of Battle, Battle of Garibpur:

Pakistani forces, unlike at Hilli, had failed to anticipate an attack on Garibpur. They had instead fortified a village north of Garibpur, Chaugacha. Their Order of Battle was thus:

107^th Infantry Brigade:

• 6^th Battalion, Punjab Regiment
• 21^st Battalion, Punjab Regiment
• 22^nd Battalion, Frontier Force
• 3^rd (Independent) Armoured Squadron – M24 Chaffee Light Tanks

The Battle of Garibpur:

Despite the Indian attack on Garibpur starting on the 20^th, the battle would only start on the 21^st. This was because of the lack of Pakistani defences at Garibpur. In fact, 14 Punjab and 45 Cavalry had captured the village by the 20^th of November. This was lightning fast – the deadline given for Garibpur’s capture was the 21^st!

But such luck was not to last.

In the night of the 20^th, Risaldar R. P. Sing of “C” Squadron, 45 Cavalry, along with a section of dismounted infantry from 14 Punjab, was on forward patrol north of the Indian positions at Garibpur. Around 0200hrs, he radioed Captain Mehta (2IC of “C” Squadron) that Pakistani infantry and armour were advancing to the Indian positions from Chaugacha. After confirming the number of tanks and infantry advancing and the axis of their advance, Major Daljit “Chiefi” Singh Narang left behind 14 Punjab in a defensive position with some 106mm Recoilless Rifles and ordered his squadron (14 tanks) of PT-76 light tanks into a horseshoe formation to ambush the Pakistani armoured column.

The night passed into day but the Pakistani forces did not attack.

Despite Major Narang being killed early in the fighting, “C” Squadron would emerge victorious. The PT-76s quickly proved themselves to be far superior to the American made M24 Chaffees, with Indian tank crews outmanoeuvring and destroying Pakistani tanks one after the other.

With the Pakistani infantry having lost their armoured support and with Indian tanks turning their fire on the advancing Pakistani infantry, the attack quickly broke and they withdrew to their positions in Chaugacha. The 102^nd Infantry Brigade, cut off from supplies by the Indian positions in Garibpur, launched no further attacks.

Conclusions:

The Battle of Garibpur was everything that the Battle of Hilli was not. It was fast paced and called more heavily on manoeuvre elements. The Indians also had the advantage of time in the preparation of their defence and knew exactly when and where to wait for the Pakistani forces. In the end, Garibpur would allow the Indian Army’s armoured columns to bypass the stronghold of Chaugacha and drive straight into the heart of East Pakistan.

Casualties:

Indian casualties were fairly light, whereas Pakistan suffered greatly.

14 Punjab suffered 28 killed and 42 wounded. Pakistani infantry casualties are unknown, however Col. Gidh estimates them to be around 300 killed and wounded.

Sources:

Brig B. S. Mehta, Burning Chaffees: A Soldier’s First-Hand Account of the 1971 War (Penguin; 2021)

Col. V. Y. Gidh, “The Unique Battle of Garibpur”, in The United Service Institution of India (October 2021), accessed at: https://usiofindia.org/publication/usi-journal/the-unique-battle-of-garibpur/

Col. V. Y. Gidh, “The Battle of Garibpur”, in Journal of Defence Studies, 15:24 (October; 2021), pp. 107-129

Introduction:

To get a sense of the political and military events that led to the November offensive, please read “To Break a State in Two“.

In November of 1971, India and Pakistan were preparing for war in East Pakistan. From the start, the Indian Army had most advantages – it had superior numbers, the IAF had air superiority, the Indian Navy’s blockade of East Pakistan was unopposed and the Mukti Bahini was wreaking havoc behind Pakistani lines. But Pakistan had one crucial advantage – the time to prepare an effective defence.

In the face of these defences, Lt. Gen. Jagjit Singh Aurora, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Indian Army’s Eastern Command and General Sam Manekshaw, the Indian Army’s Chief of Staff, realised that there was a crying need to ready the way for the Indian Army’s upcoming offensives by softening and capturing these defences. And so, two attacks were ordered – one on the village of Bogra, just South-East of the village of Hilli, and the second on the village of Garibpur.

Indian Army, Order of Battle, First Battle of Hilli:

The Indian Army had given the job of capturing Bogra to the 202^nd Mountain Brigade, under the 20^th Mountain Division. The 202^nd‘s Order of Battle was thus:

202^nd Mountain Brigade

• 5th Battalion, Garwhal Rifles
• 8th Battalion, Guards
• 22nd Battalion, Maratha Light Infantry
• 37th Mountain Regiment (artillery)
• 38th Medium Regiment (artillery, understrength)
• 100th Mountain Regiment (artillery)
• 1 Squadron of T-55s detached from 63 Cavalry

Pakistan Army, Order of Battle, First Battle of Hilli:

Defending Bogra was the Pakistan Army’s 205^th Infantry Brigade. The 205^th’s parent unit, the 16^th Infantry Division, would be unable to reinforce the 205^th. The 205^th’s Order of Battle was thus:

205^th Infantry Brigade:

• 3rd Battalion, Baluch Regiment
• 4th Battalion, Frontier Force – AKA 4FF, directly responsible for the defence of Hilli
• 32nd Battalion, Baluch Regiment
• 1 M24 Chaffee Squadron
• 1 artillery regiment

The Indian Plan of Attack:

To seize the town of Bogra, it was deemed necessary to seize the fortified village of Hilli, through which passed the road to Bogra. It was an important job and it was given to 8 Guards. North of Hilli, there was a small hamlet – Morapara. The capture of Morapara was vital for the capture of Hilli.

With H-Hour set for 0000hrs on the night of the 22^nd and 23^rd, the 202^nd Mountain Brigade’s artillery began a barrage on the Pakistani defences at Hilli a full 12 hours earlier. 8 Guards split its companies and began its attack on midnight, as the artillery fire died away. “A” and “D” Companies of 8 Guards attacked Morapara from the West while “B” and “C” attacked the hamlet from the North. The Pakistani defence would prove to be murderous in its response.

The Pakistani Defences:

The Pakistani defences, consisting of well-dug trenches, bunkers, railway cars repurposed into firing positions, mines, booby-traps and barbed wire were set up for all-round defence of Hilli and covered all of the approaches to the village. Wet and soggy paddy fields, marshes and mud surrounded Hilli on all sides except Morapara, where they were patchy at best. Consequently, Morapara was the most well-defended angle of the entire complex and simultaneously the only one from which to attack. The Pakistani 4th Frontier Force (4FF), responsible for the defence of Hilli, had turned Morapara into a stronghold.

8 Guard Attacks:

22^nd-23^rd of November:

By 0100 hours, “B” and “C” Companies had secured two hamlets north of Morapara and “C” Company and began providing covering fire for “A” and “B” Company, which began the attack on the defenses at Morapara, with “D” Company being held in reserve.

There is a saying in military circles; officers don’t duck.

This proved to be very true in the First Battle of Hilli. The Company Commander (Coy. Cdr.) of “A” Company, Major Hemant Manjrekar, was killed almost instantly by machine-gun fire. In fact, “A” Company would – by the 23^rd of November – lose all its officers, with all of them being found metres from the barbed wire or machine gun nests or trenches, having been killed in their attempt to get their men moving. The Coy. Cdr. of “B” Company, Major R. Nath, suffered the same fate and was killed very early on in the attack by MG fire. The two companies, having now lost the majority of their officers, would be led by Captain S.K. Bansal, Subedar Raj Bahadur Singh and Naib Subedar Mohammed Nayeem.

By now, it had become clear that unless reinforcements were sent – or the Pakistanis distracted – the attack would fail. As it stood, “A” and “B” Companies, despite the lack of officers, had captured portions of Morapara in the West. But they desperately needed reinforcements.

To this end, Brigadier Bhatti (the Commanding Officer of the 202^nd) ordered 5 Garwhal to attack Basudeopur, a fortified hamlet adjacent to Morapara that was also firing on 8 Guards. Basudeopur fell fairly quickly to 5 Garwhal’s assault and opened the way for “D” Company of 8 Guards to reinforce the beleaguered “A” and “B” Companies.

“D” Company’s Coy. Cdr., leading by example, destroyed a machine-gun bunker – though he was struck by its fire and wounded. He repeatedly refused evacuation and continued to fight and inspire his men, until finally, he collapsed – dead. For this, he was posthumously awarded the Sena Medal. “D” Company would now be commanded by Captain V. Sharma – and he had a hard fight ahead.

Throughout the night, 4FF launched multiple counterattacks on 8 Guards – all of which were repelled. However, the situation was perilous. The 4 T-55s of 63 Cavalry had never arrived and the firepower required to break through the Pakistani defences was simply absent. The T-55s, unsuitable to the boggy terrain of Bangladesh, had gotten stuck in the mud over a kilometre away and were of no help.

And so, 8 Guards endured the night. By midday on the 23^rd, Brigadier P. T. Ghogale (a veteran of the battle) recalls:

“… the situation was uncertain with “D” Company running out of ammunition and the enemy carrying out intense shelling. … Although there was a partial hold on Morapara, [elements] had to withdraw under intense fire and shelling… Throughout [the 23^rd] a stalemate continued, characteristic of an infantry battle … The situation could have gone either way. … All attempts to breakthrough from the North and West failed.”

Brig. P. T. Ghogale

24^th of November:

On the night of the 24^th, there was salvation.

The remainder of “C” Company, previously unable to reinforce, reached the rest of the battalion and bolstered the perimeter.

2^nd Lt. K. S. R. Jain of “C” Company was successful in leading a column of infantry silently through the Pakistani lines and securing a foothold in the east of Morapara, with the rest of “C” Company then immediately attacked and captured.

Through the night, 4 PT-76 light tanks – unbothered by the mud and sludge that had bogged down the T-55s – reached 8 Guard’s position. Then, in the morning, the reinforced 8 Guards, supported by tank and artillery fire, attacked 4FF’s lines in Morapara. By 1000hrs, Morapara had fallen and with it had ended the First Battle of Hilli.

Conclusions:

Despite 8 Guard’s success in capturing Morapara, the First Battle of Hilli was a stalemate – it can also perhaps be called an Indian defeat. The actual objective, Hilli, remained in Pakistani hands. In fact, Hilli would not be captured until the Second Battle of Hilli on the 10^th-11^th of December. This battle, and the immense rate of casualties the Indian forces incurred, assured the Indian Army that attacking Pakistani strong-points head-on was not a good idea and influenced the plan of the upcoming offensive. An offensive which focused on outmanoeuvring, surrounding and destroying Pakistani strongpoints.

Casualties:

The casualties were – for both sides – immense but, due to the nature of the battle, Indian forces suffered far more than Pakistani forces. India suffered 66 Killed in Action and 130 Wounded in Action, whereas Pakistan suffered a total of 80 Killed and Wounded.

As Brigadier P. T. Ghogale said simply: “The Battle of Hilli is the most … savagely fought battle of the Indo-Pak Conflict.”

Sources:

Brig. P. T. Ghogale, “The Battle of Hilli”, in Maj. Gen. Ian Cardozo, In Quest of Freedom: The War of 1971, Personal Accounts by Soldiers from India and Bangladesh (Centre for Land Warfare Studies; 2016), pp. 79-88

Chiber, Anuraag, “Tactical Lessons from the Battle of Hilli”, Scholar Warrior (2016), pp. 110-116

History Division, MoD, GOI, Official History of the 1971 India-Pakistan War – Chapter 12: All Out War in Bangladesh