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  • The Military Revolution in Europe, Vol. II: Battle Tactics, the Self-Denying Ordinance and the New Model Army

    The Military Revolution in Europe, Vol. II: Battle Tactics, the Self-Denying Ordinance and the New Model Army

    This article has been written for Easy History by Patrick Moody, a historian of the English Civil War.

    Previous article: The Military Revolution in Europe, Vol. I: The English and Scottish Armies of the 17th Century

    Introduction:

    Combined arms fighting during the 17TH century, known as “Pike and Shot”, was a bloody and confusing affair. Quickly advancing technology was mixed together with tried-and-true medieval, haphazardly at first, but this quickly formed into competing “systems” on the field of battle. The English authorities recognized the value of standardized drill and in 1623 the Privy Council and Council of War authorized the publication of Instructions for Musters and Arms which became the foundation for the training of the county militias and inevitably found its way into the trained bands in the years leading up to the Civil War. It wasn’t the only publication on warfare to be published in England, not by far. Between 1602 and 1655 no more than 95 military handbooks, drill books, and manuals flew off the London printers, some with entertaining names such as Edward Cooke’s The Perspective Glass of Warre, shewing  you a glimpse of Warres Mysteries (1628). Perhaps the most widely used and recognized were the drill books from the Spanish Netherlands, where the leader of the Dutch Revolt, Prince Maurice of Orange, resurrected old Roman tactics and instituted regular training of his soldiers, a practice that had fallen out of fashion during the days of the local militia or trained bands. Jacob de Gheyn’s The Exercise of Arms for Cavaliers, Muskets, and Pikes (1607) was one of the most widely read, and provided the basis for the most common fighting system of the period.

    These drill books and manuals reflected the shifting military tactics in Europe at the time. In the first part of this article, we will be studying these new tactics, new armies and new forms of waging war with our lens landing on everything from Sweden to England. It is important to understand these systems, however unknown they may be or irrelevant they may seem, because they feed into the second part of this article – how the Armies of England and Scotland shaped and formed themselves on the eve of the Civil Wars.

    The Military Systems of Europe:

    The Spanish Tercio
    The earliest method of pike and shot warfare, in which soldiers would organize themselves into massive square or rectangle formation, blocks of pikemen in the center with arquebusiers (musketeers) at each corner and entire block. The arquebusiers would fire, and then quickly move into the blocks of pikemen for protection.

    The Tercio Formation (left)

    The Dutch System
    Based upon the Roman “cohort”, Dutch regiments contained the classical number of 550 men each, made up of 250 pikemen and 300 musketeers. Staggered in a “chequerboard” formation, the central pike block were 5 to 10 men deep. The musketeers would form up on the flanks in groups 8 to 12 and perform the “countermarch”. This allowed the front rank to fire, then turn around and allow the next to form up and fire, and so on, providing a constant volley in an era where reloading took some time. The countermarch proved incredibly effective given the proper number of musketeers, trained by the book (literally) to load their weapons quickly. The role of cavalry, in theory, was to provide cover on the flanks. They also performed a maneuver known as the caracole, in which cavalry, like the musketeers, would perform their own version of a countermarch: charging towards the enemy, firing their pistols, and wheeling away to allow the next line of horse to fire, typically in 3 files.

    An illustration of a Dutch formation.

    The Swedish System

    The cannon typically used by King Gustavu’s armies.

    Formulated by Protestant warrior king Gustavus Adolphus, this system improved on the Dutch System based on Adolphus’ wars against Poland (1626-9) and his time as one of the leading players of the Thirty Years War. Using the same basic infantry tactics as the Dutch, Adolphus instead chose to spread his men thinner, six ranks deep. The fewer ranks allowed for more concentrated firepower. This led to the deadly “Swedish Salvo”, where the rearmost ranks would step up and fill the gaps. One rank would bend down on one knee, the second would crouch, and the third would stand. Firing simultaneously, this massive blast of shot would hopefully hamper the enemy enough to break their formation and allow the infantry and cavalry to charge. Adolphus also abandoned the caracole, adopting a much more aggressive horse tactic, in which the lines would not simply fire off a shot and wheel away, but rather charge into the enemy. The front two ranks would fire their pistols and draw their swords to close in for a melee, while the third rank would charge into the enemy with only swords. The Swedish System also included the use of light field guns able to be maneuvered by small teams during battle. In short, Adolphus took what the Dutch had done and upped the firepower and ruthlessness of the cavalry.

    The English Civil War Association Armies
    While one side of the conflict had a centralized figure (Charles I) to rally behind and their organization and command structure was very centralized, Parliament had to overcome the exact opposite issue. Essentially, they did have an overall commander of forces, the Earl of Essex, whose leadership and military capabilities were often called into question. Despite this, rather than a single standing army, Parliament formed theirs into “Associations”, the Eastern, Northern, Western, and Southern. Commanders were, of course, noblemen from the House of Lords, including Manchester, Essex, and Waller.

    Communication and support between the various Associations was lacking, and since they were all territory based, many troops did not feel comfortable going far from home. Adding to the uncomfortableness of marching so far from their families, the personal ambitions of their social-superior commanders often led to more defeats or missed opportunities.  

    Such leadership led the more aggressive party (led by Henry Vane and Oliver Cromwell), or the “War Party”, to do away with any more peace talks. They were frustrated with Manchester, spiteful of Essex, and harsh on Waller. They sought a new, professional army, rather than a mix of militia, trained bands, and pressed soldiers serving in separate armies under very different commanders.

    The Self-Denying Ordinance:

    The War Party’s first step was to introduce a bill to Parliament known as the Self-Denying Ordinance, which forced any member of either House of Parliament to give up their military commissions. The language is as follows:

    “Be it Ordained by the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament, That all and every of the Members of either House of Parliament shall be, and by Authority of this Ordinance are discharged at the end of forty days after the passing of this Ordinance, of and from all and every Office or Command Military or Civil, granted or conferred by both or either of the said Houses of this present Parliament, or by any Authority derived from both or either of them, since the Twentieth day of November, 1640.”

    Essentially, this was Parliament “cleaning house”, removing the dead-weight nobles who they accused of purposely dragging out the war, fearful of bringing it to a decisive military conclusion. It also made a clear delineation between who was a politician and who was a soldier. Ironically, one very important MP avoided this Ordinance: Oliver Cromwell. His skills as a cavalry commander in the Eastern Association esteemed him to Parliament, who were more than happy to make an exception and allow him to continue leading his “Ironsides”, the most effective horse Parliament had.

     The wording of the Ordinance also helped, as it stated that any MP who was affected by said Ordinance could resume their military position after 40 days, a loophole which both Cromwell and William Brereton exploited to continue their commands, while shaming the prideful Essex & Manchester from asking for their commissions back.

    Once the old guard was gone, Parliament got to work on a “New Modelling” of its army. It needed to be professional. It needed to be centralized. It needed officers of experience and skill, not titles. It needed to be properly outfitted and equipped. Most of all, it needed to be ready to bring the war to an end. This was the birth of the New Model Army.

    The New Model Army

    The “New Model” was placed under the overall command of Sir Thomas Fairfax, who had proved his worth on the field and played no part in politics, making him an ideal choice. He was appointed Commander-in Chief of the army in January 1645. His fellow officers were Philip Skippon (Major-General of Foot), Oliver Cromwell (Lieutenant General of Horse, later second-in-command, eventual Commander-in-Chief), and Thomas Hammond (Lieutenant General of Ordinance).

    An illustration of a “New Model” formation.

    The New Model was intended to comprise 22,000 men, broken into 12 regiments of foot of 1,200 each, the ratio being 2:1 musketeer to pikemen. 11 regiments of horse comprising 600 men each was also raised, along with 1,00 dragoons, although these in time became regular cavalry. The size of the New Model waxed and waned during the Wars of the Three Kingdoms. At one time the 24 regiments had swelled to nearly 100, at one time boasting a total of nearly 68,000 soldiers.

    New Model soldiers.

    The army was strictly disciplined, but in turn received something that was rare among the Association armies: regular pay. Pay records show the infantry were paid eight pence per day, while the cavalry received 2 shillings per day. They were also issued matching uniforms, making it easy to recognize friend from foe, a common problem at the time. It was also a meritocracy, in which common soldiers were able to rise through the ranks regardless of class or birth.

    Members of the New Model were sometimes pressed into service, though many were religious radicals who truly saw the King as evil. Soldiers were issued Bibles and chaplains were added to every regiment, where the men attended regular prayer meetings. Officers were also put in charge of specific departments, including military justice administration, acquisition of provisions, and Parliament’s great advantage: an effective intelligence network.

    The New Model Army was put to its first real test at the Battle of Naseby, where the bulk of King Charles’ army was crushed. This was followed by a string of brilliant victories in Langport and Bristol, and finally Stow-on-the-Wold, effectively bringing an end to the First English Civil War.

    Until the Restoration of the Monarchy in 1660, the New Model Army remained a permanent fixture, so much so that it became a political body in and of itself, an instrument with which Cromwell used to further the aims of the Independents (and his own control) over Parliament. Oftentimes, the threat of unleashing the New Model was the only thing keeping the very fragile peace of Cromwell’s “Protectorate” government alive.

    Thomas Fairfax gave up his command when Cromwell decided to attack Scotland, who just a few years prior had been Parliament’s greatest ally. The New Model smashed the Scots at Dunbar, then at Worcester in an attempt by the Scots to place Charles’ son on the throne.  It saw much service in Ireland, where known atrocities were committed against the Irish Catholic garrison at Drogheda and the bloody sacking of Wexford. It also provided soldiers for expeditions to the West Indies, which included the capture of Jamaica.

    Upon the Restoration, King Charles II officially disbanded all units of the New Model Army but one: General George Monck’s regiment, which had marched from Scotland to London in order to bring back the purged Parliament and reestablish the Monarchy. It would be named the Coldstream Guards. This has remained the oldest regiment in continuous service in the British army.

    Through proper command structure, drilling & discipline, the New Model Army under Sir Thomas Fairfax paved the way for the order and success of the professional British Army.

    And those red coats? You can thank the New Model for that. Venetian red.

    Sources:

    BHO. ‘April 1645: An ordinance for the discharging of the Members of both Houses from all Offices both Military and Civil.’, in Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum, 1642-1660, ed C H Firth and R S Rait (London, 19110, pp. 664-665. British History Online.

    Carlton, Charles Going to the Wars: The Experience of the British Civil Wars, 1638-1651. (1992). Routelage. London.

    Cartwright, Mark “The New Model Army” World History Encyclopedia.

    Firth, C.H Cromwell’s Army. (1902). London.

    Lipscombe, Nick Combined Arms Tactics in the English Civil War. Nicklipscombe.net.

    Lipscombe, Nick The English Civil War: An Atlas & Concise History of The Wars of the Three Kingdoms 1638-51. (2020).Osprey Publishing. London.

    Roberts, Keith Pike and Shot Tactics 1590-1660. (2010).  Oxford.

    Roberts, Keith Cromwell’s War Machine, the New Model Army 1645-60. (2005) Barnsley.

    Spring, Laurence Campaigns of the Eastern Association: The Rise of Oliver Cromwell, 1642-1645. (2020). Helion & Company. Warwick.

    Syler, Barry Moving 17th Century Soldiers. Syler.com

  • The Arabian Sea in the 17th Century, Vol. II: The Maratha Navy and the European Powers

    The Arabian Sea in the 17th Century, Vol. II: The Maratha Navy and the European Powers

    Introduction:

    In the previous article, we looked at the slow but steady rise of the EIC in the Arabian Sea, despite fierce mercantile opposition by the likes of the Dutch VOC or the Portuguese India House. Using a mix of bribery, lobbying and the cultivation of relationships with the Mughal Emperors, the EIC began to pull clean ahead of their rivals and – by the middle of the 17th Century – they were in a position to become the dominant trading power in India. But, just as things were looking up for them, a band of rebels in the heart of India – the Deccan – began upsetting the balance created by the Mughals.

    The Maratha War of Independence saw the Konkan and Malabbar coastlines, the hub of the Portuguese business, ravaged by the nasty business of warfare. As more and more sea-forts along the coastline came into the control of Chhatrapiti Shivaji Maharaj, he realised that there was a crying need for defending his nascent and infant nation from the maritime designs of the Europeans and Mughals. He had no Navy that could repel a potential attack from the sea and this, he calculated, needed to be remedied immediately.

    The Birth of the Maratha Navy and Its Immediate Objectives:

    As Dr. Apte, the world’s pre-eminent scholar on the Maratha Navy, notes; when Shivaji began his “career of independence”, the Konkan coastline was filled with powers that were alien to the Deccan. By 1650, the Konkan coastline was inhabited by the Siddis of Janjira (the naval arm of the Mughal Empire and Africans by blood) and the Portuguese India House and the Portuguese Navy. The British, though present, were considered to be a minor player along the Konkan coastline.

    As Shivaji came into control of more and more territory along Konkan, Mawal and Kolaba he realised that the sovereignty of the sea did not rest with him. And so, he decided to raise the Maratha Navy – to establish Maratha maritime armed dominance over the Konkan coastline and seize the sovereignty of the sea away from the Portuguese and Mughals.

    But, before we proceed, we must define this very vague term, “sovereignty of the seas”. The definition is simple; it is the ability of a nation or state to control the maritime access to its ports, the seas that are immediate to its coastline and to exert its will on the seas unopposed. This “sovereignty of the seas” belonged, at this time, to the Portuguese. Not even the Siddis of Janjira had been able to rest the control of the Arabian Sea from them. And, despite Shivaji’s plans of dismantling Siddi naval power and establishing a Maratha Navy that dominated along the whole west coast of India, his primary focus was snatching away the control of the Arabian Sea from the Portuguese. Alongside his obvious military goals, he also wanted to establish a firm sea link and dominate the trade between the Konkan and East Africa and Arabia.

    Therefore, it can be concluded that at the beginning of the Maratha naval story, the Maratha Navy’s objectives were thus:

    • Protect the infant Maratha kingdom from the sea
    • Defeat Siddi naval power
    • Check growing European influence in the Arabian Sea
    • Establish trade routes from the Konkan to the East of Africa and Arabia

    In the late 1650s (specifically 1657 and 1658), the first Maratha Navy Ships were “commissioned” into service. The first Maratha shipyards were built at Bhiwandi and Kalyan and, within 3 years, they had created 85 warships for the Navy. Overtime, though mostly in the 1660s, the Marathas also built new shipyards in Thane, Alibaug, Vijaydurg and Malvan.

    The 1660s were the golden age for “Shivaji’s Navy”. Shivaji embarked upon many raids on Mughal, Portuguese and British ports up and down the west coast of India. Though the Navy was still a few decades away from commanding the whole of the Arabian Sea, they had become the terrors of the coastal waters. If ever they found themselves outgunned, as was often the case when faced with much larger and much better European warships, they would retreat inland where massive Maratha fortress guns would reduce those European warships into flotsam. And by the time of Shivaji’s death, everyone in the region accepted the hegemony of the Maratha Navy over the Konkan Coastline.

    The Revenge under attack by Shivaji’s ships, 1679

    Though the Maratha Navy would be far more successful under Admiral Kanhoji Angre and his sons, the 1660-1680 period was the only time when the Maratha Navy and Maratha Army were a unified and coherent force. After the death of Shivaji, the Maratha Navy split with the Maratha Army and became an “independent wing” of the Maratha State, taking orders form neither Chhatrapiti nor Peshwa.

    The “Angrian” Navy and Maratha Dominance of the Arabian Sea:

    Kanhoji Angre had joined the Maratha Navy at a very early age. It is not possible to say just how early, but he was 18 when he was made Commander of Suvarnadurg in 1685, an important Maratha sea-fort. Over the next 14 years, the Maratha Navy maintained its course and kept a firm grasp on the Konkan Coastline. However, upon becoming the Admiral of the Maratha Navy (sarkhel)in 1698, Kanhoji Angre set his sights well beyond the brown waters of the coast.

    British ships in India in the late 1600s

    He was, it must be noted, an excellent sailor and commander. But, he had a vital flaw that he shared with probably everyone of any note or authority in the Maratha Empire at the time. He could not see beyond the destruction his enemies and the enlargement of his own personal power. He did not envision the Navy as a tool of commerce, as had Shivaji. He did not bother with setting up manufacturing facilities for his guns and instead settled on purchasing them. He saw the Maratha Navy as only a machine with which to vanquish the Portuguese, English and Mughals. He never intended to create a network of commerce to feed the Maratha state. But, these flaws mixed with his singular focus on victory meant he was exceptional at battle.

    Despite being the commander of a professional Navy, he immediately began to engage in what can only be called acts of piracy. His ships began to seek out lone East Indiamen (merchants sailing under the EIC flag) with the goal of either taking the ship and her crew captive to ransom later or to sink her entirely after taking as much of her cargo as possible. The Bombay was one of Angre’s first targets. The Bombay was the flagship of the East India Marine, stationed at her namesake city, Bombay. She was set upon by Angre’s ships in 1707 and sunk, with all hands.

    The Maratha gallivat Sadashiv, flying the flag of the Sarkhel (green)

    Kanhoji’s piracy, which perhaps can be called commerce raiding in modern maritime parlance, began to hurt the East India Company’s profits. They expended a significant amount of money, time, capability and war-fighting resources into containing this new marauder. However, for the first 2 decades of the 18th Century, they remained under the proverbial thumb of Angre and his Navy. Between 1707 and 1721, the East India Marine with some support from the Royal Navy mounted perhaps 6 expeditions against the Maratha Navy, with 3 of them launched between 1718-1721. All 6 of these expeditions would fail to destroy the Maratha Navy or significantly damage their ability to wage war. Despite their failure to dissuade their enemy from their designs against the EIC, they had managed to gain control of the trade routes from Arabia and East Africa to India… partially.

    The Maratha Navy had been unable to maintain its control over the shipping lanes in the deep seas. The Maratha ships – a topic too vast to go into detail about in this article – were not ideal for ocean travel, much less ocean combat. They were best suited for the shallow waters of the coast and to harness the many inlets that dotted the Konkan for either quick getaways or ambush attacks, with Maratha coastal batteries providing the fire support that the ships sometimes lacked. The much larger, heavier and sturdier European “Ships of the Line” or “Men of War” were – near as makes no difference – invulnerable to the Maratha Navy’s much smaller “gurabs” and “gallivats”. As such, following 2 decades of constant warfare, the Maratha Navy withdrew to the coast and focused on where it was strongest; coastal warfare. Because it didn’t matter if the EIC controlled the deep sea shipping lanes given that all ships had to get close to the coast to sail into port.

    Up until 1729, the Maratha Navy was unchallenged along the West Coast of India, with every European power paying tax to ensure the safe passage of their ships and the assurance that the Maratha Navy would protect lone merchantmen from pirates. In 1729, however, with the death of Kanhoji Angre, that would all begin to slowly crumble.

    Civil War, the Siege of Vijaydurg and the Fall of the Maratha Navy:

    The fall of Vijaydurg

    The Maratha’s medieval system of governance would see that all of Angre’s successes were turned to dust within 30 years of his death. The causes for the ultimate and total defeat of the Maratha Navy in 1756 at the Siege of Vijaydurg are complex – but the short-sighted and factional politics that brought the Maratha Empire to a very early end are the chief reasons.

    Firstly, it is vital to note that Angre had, for all intents and purposes, split with the Maratha government during the Maratha Civil War, declaring his support for Tarabai over Shahu. Though histories of the Maratha Civil War focus on the armies of the opposing factions fighting it out for control of the Maratha throne, multiple times did Shahu try to subdue the Maratha Admiral. Angre, proving to be as skilled at land warfare as he was on the waves, overcame these small raids sent out to arrest him and continued operating independently of the Maratha administration. What this meant was that when he died, he trusted no one but his own family to run the Navy. Therefore, he split the Navy equally between his 4 sons, hoping that they would carry on his work. However, that was not the case. While they saw some success against the EIC and the Portuguese, they spent the majority of their time fighting each other for ultimate control of the Maratha Navy. This gave the EIC the time it needed to collect itself and prepare for another expedition.

    Secondly, given the strength of the Maratha Navy (Angre had direct control over more forts than the Maratha Army had forts in total), the Maratha administration began to view it as an active threat to the Peshwas and the Chhatrapiti, despite the fact that the Navy had not come into conflict with the Army since the first years of the 18th Century. The British, sly as ever, sought to deepen this wound and drive a wedge between the two, with promises of weaponry, peace and money made to the Maratha Peshwas in exchange for military support against the Maratha Navy. This deal, once struck, would prove to be the nail in the coffin for the Maratha Navy, because, in 1756 a fleet of 20-30 Royal Navy warships descended on Vijaydurg – the HQ of the Maratha Navy – carrying with them roughly 1,500 men of the Maratha Army.

    Maratha ships ablaze in the Siege of Vijaydurg

    By 1756, the Maratha Army had swept through the Konkan region and had taken by force every fort commanded by the Navy. Vijaydurg was the last bastion of that once proud force. It had withstood 3 sieges before and repelled every attack made on it. But this time, no such luck. The Maratha Navy outnumbered the British ships 10 to 1 but there was a fatal flaw in Tulaji Angre’s plan. He sailed out his entire fleet to destroy the British, without taking into consideration the close quarters of the geography and the fact that the British outranged his ships by a considerable range. The Maratha ships became bunched up at the opening of the creek; when the British ships fired, they set ablaze the Restoration, a captured EIC ship pressed into Maratha service. The fire aboard the Restoration spread from ship to ship, turning into an inferno. No Maratha ship survived that battle. Simultaneously, the Maratha Army launched an amphibious attack on Vijaydurg, with British ships providing withering fire support.

    In one fell swoop, the British had managed to remove the last obstacle to their total domination of the Indian Ocean.

    Sources:

    Phillip MacDougall, Naval Resistance to England’s Growing Power in India, 1660-1800 (Boydell & Brewer: Boydell Press)

    B. K. Apte, ‘Sovereignty Of The Sea As Practiced In The Maratha Period’, Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, 29 (1967), pp. 255-261

    B. K. Apte, A History of the Maratha Navy and Merchantships (State Board for Literature and Culture; Bombay/Mumbai, 1973)

    Anirudh Deshpande, Limitations of Military Technology: Naval Warfare on the West Coast, 1650-1800, Economic and Political Weekly, 27: 17 (1992), pp. 900-904

    Sachin Pendse, ‘Maratha Sea Power’ in Christian Buchet (ed.), Gerard Le Boudec (ed.), The Sea in History – The Early Modern World (Boydell & Brewer: Boydell Press), pp. 635-647

    Ed Cumming, A Compendium of Incidents Incurred by the Major Ships used by the English (later British) East India Company c.1600 to c.1834 (2016)